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Abstract
The s tudy wa s designed to determine how children learn
covariation information and whether increasing the numbe r of
irrelevant dimens ions would faci l itate implicit learning.
Ninety-six fourth and fifth graders were trained on sets of
three stimuli varying in s ize (l a r g e and smal l) and shape
(c u r ved and straight ). Of the three stimuli , o ne
represented the covariation between shape an d size (e.g.,
large and curved). Hal f of the participants were t r a i ned on
sets with one irrelevant di mens i on (position of the stimulus
on the computer screen) an d half were trained on sets with
t wo irrelevant dimensions (position and the stimulus
pattern; open, filled, or striped) . Fol lowing training,
participants were exposed t o a t ransfer task with novel
st.imuli, but the same covariation employed in training .
Finally, participants wer e g i ven a verba l awa neneae test
requi ring them to tel l the e xpe r i ment e r ho w t.hny solved the
p roblem . This test resulted i n three classifications:
ve rbal ly aware (exp licit l e a rn e r s ) , pa r t i a l l y awa re, and not
ve rbally aware (impl icit l earners) .
All participants includ ed in t he anal ys e s reached
c riterion during t raining , indicating J:hat c h ildren ca n
(il)
learn covari at ion information either ey.plid.tly or
implicitly . As the complexi ty of the task Lncreeeed , the
learning rate f or all participants decreased, particularly
f or the expLf c i t; lee.rners who presumably relied on
hyp ot he s i s testing . On transfer , explicit l e a rn e r s
pe rformed better than implici t Leernera . The i mplici t
system was not particularly smart, perhaps due t o a reliance
on c on t ex t.ua c cues acquired in a s s oc i a t i ve learning .
Part ial learners performed l ike implicit learners on
t r a ns fe r wh en trained on one i rrelevant dimension, and l i ke
explicit learners when trained on two i r r ele v ant d i mens i on s .
From t he s e results several assumptions were made about
cognitive processes . First, both impl icit and explici t
pathways are act ivated in a learning task, with e,:pl ici t
l ear n i ng rate f a ll i ng off more steeply t h an the Lrepl.Lc Lt;
learning rate as a function of increas ing task difficulty .
Second, an intersection occurs wnere both implicil~ and
ex plicit l e ar n i ng are oc cu r r ing a t approximately cbe same
rate ; task difficulty a t the point o f intersection will
va r y between individuals . The refore, an individual who
usually learns imp licitly has an intercept at a l ow level of
task diffiCUlty and learns diffi cult
(ii i )
problems implicit l Y. An ind i vidual ....he us ua lly learns
expl i citly ha s an i n t.e r c ep t. at. a high l evel o f t a s k
dif ficulty an d learns easier p r oblems explicitly . The t.hird
assumpt ion was t ha t partial learners acqui r e informat ion a t
a pproximately t he same rate i mplicitly an d e xp l i c it. ly; in
ccne x words . e ach partial learner i s a t t.he po int of
i nte rsect i on . Whim an i ndivi dua l i s a pa r t i a l learner on an
easy t ask, their implicit an d expl i ci t learning curves a r e
p resumed t o resemble tho s e o f indi viduals who u s ually learn
Lmpl Lrri t Ly . When an individual is a pa rtial learner on a
difficult t a sk, their implicit and exp licit l e a r n i ng curves
are presumed t o r es emble those of i nd ividuals who us ua lly
learn expl i ci tly . The f inal assumpt i on was t ha t l e a r ne rs
wi ll sh ow a prefe re n ce f or access i ng e ither i mp licit o r
e xpl i cit info rma tion ba sed o n how they usua lly s olve s imila r
problems .
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Int roduction
A r e c en t debate in the cognitive literature has
focussed a round how "smart " o r "dumb" the unconscious is .
One of the ma i n questions t ha t has been r e s e a r ch ed involves
the level (or levels) o f analysis at which the coqnd t.Lve
unconscious fu n c t i ons as it processes information that ca n
later influence thoughts , pe rceptions, a nd behaviours .
Research a nd reviews to da t e uncover mixed evidence for
s imple ve rsus sophi s t icated unconscious processes .
Consequent ly, a renewed int e rest in, an d greater scrutiny
of, t he c ogn i t i ve unconscious ha s ensued .
The cognitive l i terature i s rich wi th evide nce for
unconscious acquisition of i nformation, pa rticularly within
priming studies and lear ning paradigms. However, other
tasks have yielded i n f orma t i on that i s i ncons i s t e n t
regarding t he so phistication of unconsc ious processes (s e e
Greenwal d , 199 2; Sha nks & St . J ohn, 1994 fQr reviews) .
priming studies demonst rate f ac ilitation of the pe r ception
of previously seen single wo r ds and figures, even when t hose
words an d f igures are degrade d to the p oi nt of not being
conscious l y de tectab le (Tulvi ng & Sch acter, 199 1; Lo f t us &
Klinge r , 1992) . Howe ver , f a cilita t i on has not been obtained
with mare complex sequences of words. Thus, priming seems
to occur with simple but not comp Lex stimuli.
Similarly, subliminal activation research has yielded
inconsistent results which consequently challenge the
sophLsuLca t Lcn of. unconscious processes. In subliminal
activation studies target s timuli (visual or auditory) are
below the threshold for conscious detection. Kunst-Wilson
and zajonc (1980) reported that participants exposed to
shapes at intervals too brief to allow for later
recognition, gave more favourable ratings to those stimuli
to which they had been previously exposed. Mandler,
Nakamuri, and Van Zandt (19B7) found that pr:7.or exposure in
the absence of recognition faci litates any xefevaut;
judgement about the stimulus. Cl e a rly , informacion chat can
facilitate later pe rformance has been processed at; an
unconsc ious level.
Greenwald (1992) argued that despite the evidence for
unconscious processing in priming studies, the processes
cnemeervee are nut particularly sophisticated . Therefore,
such evidence l e nd s no credence to the unconscious as a
complex entity. Similarly, with r e sp e c t to t he subliminal
a c t i va tio n research, Gr eenwald p r opos e s t hat t he memory
t r ace s f or s ha pe s or words presented duri ng t he expos ure
phases are qui t e simplis tic and should not be used a s
ev tdance, f or a h ighly soph i stic a ted unconsc ious . Greenwal d
(199 2) does not attempt t o discount evid enc e f or unconscious
proce s ses . However , he does cau t Lon r e ad e r s that t he l e ve l s
o f analysis upon which the u nconsc i ous is ope rat i ng i n t he s e
s tud i e s a re s o f und ament.a L t hat arguments f or a comp l e x
u nconscious are premature .
Des pite the s cept i c i sm, much re s earch exists in support
of t he act ivation of t he unconscious , particu larly within
learning paradigms . Suc h unconscious a cquis i t i on of
i n f orma t i on , or s o- called " i mpl icit learning " , ha s been
demons t r ated in the cog nitive l i tera ture a nd wi ll be t he
fo cu s o f this study (s ee Reber, 1989 ; Lewi c k i , Hill &
c ayee vsx a, 1992 f or r eviews) .
In t he f ollowi ng sec tions , i s s ues r e l a t ed t o the
i mplicit acqu i si t ion o f i n f orma tion will be addressed .
Distinction s wil l be made between the c ons c i ous and
unconscious l earning pathways, whe t he r the un consc ious
pa thway is capabl e of acqui ring i nformation , ho w t he
implicit sys tem may be more e fficient t han the exp licit
system, the r elat i ve s op his t i ca t i on of the implicit system,
an d whe t her or not the pr oce s s e s engaged i n by the imp licit
system may be r ega rd ed as "smar t " . Criticisms of implicit
l earn i ng research also will be discussed . Specific t o the
present study, unconsc ious l earning wi ll be add r e s sed from a
developmental pe rspective and r ea s on s wi ll be presented
regarding why ch ildren may b e bet t er part i cipant s than
adults in impl icit learning studies.
Def i n ing The Conscious - llnCQJ1sci0uB Dichotomy
Al t hough at the most basic l ev e l "un cons c i ous " merely
means "un awa r e of". Greenwald (1992) p os e s two senses of the
conscious-unconscious dichotomy. The first sense of
"uncons c i ou s" is that which i s "outside of attent ion". From
this point of view, t he conscious en d of the dichotomy is
viewed as a select ive aspect o f attention. Therefore,
i s unconscious or unaware of a stimul us when it falls
outside the focus of selective attention but still impinges
on receptors . An illustration of this s e ns e o f
"unconscious" would be the d i cho tic l ist e n i ng t ask , In
this select!ve at tention t ask, two differen t messages are
del ivered to the two ea rs, bu t only one me s s ag e , that which
is de livered t o t he primary channel, us ually is attend ed t o .
Some evidence e x i sts f or the l ow l e v e l a na lysis of phys ica l
features and intermediate l ev e l a nalysis or: word meaning
f rom informatio n delivered in the secondary channel ,
providing su ppo rt for t he un con s c ious proces s ing of
un a t t end ed stimul i (s e e Gree nwald , 1992 , fo r r e v i ew).
The second sens e o f -un conec t ous s d e s cribed by
Greenwald (1992) is · l a ck 0::'" fa ilu r e o f rne r ospece t cn s .
Here , if consciousne s s i s pz'naurned t o be a n i nd ivi du a l 's
abili ty to valid.ly report ex perience , then unconsciousness
is descr i bed as an individua l's inability to verbally report
t he stimuli to whi ch t hey have attended . Su ch dissociation
between performance and awareness has be en demonstrated i n
mos t i mpl icit l e a r ni ng re search (Rebe r, 196 7; Rebe r, 1 97 6 ;
Rebe r & Lewi s , 19 7 7 ; Lewicki , 198 6 ; Lewi c ki, Czyzews ka , &
Hof fman, 19 87 ; Lewicki , Hill , (. Bizot, 1 98 8 ) . It i s th i s
sort of "v e r ba l l y unr eportable · a cqu i s i t i on of i n fo rma tion
that is t he f ocus of the present s tudy .
Uncpnsci ous !tc m lisition Qf In f Qmation
The next po int o f content ion i s whe the r it is p os s i ble
fo r human s t o a cquire information unconsciously; that is,
wi t hou t t h e informa tion be i ng ve rba lly report ab l e. Des pite
t he curr ent de bates su r rou nd i ng the so phistication of
implicit processes, the answer would app ear to be "ye a'".
Such "implicit learning", according to Rebe r (19 67 ), occurs
without concurrent awareness of what i s be ing learned and
can be viewed as dis t inct from "explicit learning" . But
what exactly is implicit l earn i ng ? Se ger (1994 ) offers
t hree criteria t ha t characteri ze t he nature of implicit
learning. The firs t c riter ion states that the knowl e dge
t hat is acquired as a func t ion of implicit. learning is not
available to c on s ciou s nes s . This would a ppear to be the
case by virtue of the fact that individuals pa rticipat ing in
implicit learning studies a re r are l y capable o f providing a
ve rbal account of what they ha ve learned (Lewicki , 1986;
Lewicki ee a l . , 1987; Lewicki et a L ; , 1988 ; Rebe r, 1967;
Rebe r & Lewis, 1977) .
The second criterion states that the information
ac qui red during impl icit learning is more complex and
sophisticated t h an the l ear n i ng of s i mpl e associat ions or
f requencies (Seger, 199 4) . Seger (1994) co ntends t ha t
i mplicit learning r e f l e ct.s the acquisition o f information
t h a t is rather abs tract and presumab ly too sophis t i ca ted to
be ha ndl ed efficiently by t he conscious . Both of t hese
criterion echo t he de s criptions already p u t f o rth by Rebe r
(1989 ) a nd suppo r ted b y Lewi ck i et a l. (19 92 ). However , the
existing literature fails to specify the processes that may
be i nvolved in implicit l e a r n i ng . Despite the conjectures
of Seger (1994) , participants may indeed be l e a r ni ng s imple
associations or automatically tallying frequency co unts .
For example, i n the rule-based implicit l earn i n g pa rad igm,
such as t he artificial grammar studies of Reber (19 67;
1976), some b i g r ams or larger stimulus atring segments are
generated that have a highe r f r equ ency count t h an others .
The participants in these studies may become sensitive to
the frequency of certain segments . Similarly. i n the
pattern learning paradigm employed by Lewicki and colleauges
(1 986 ; 1987,' 1988 ) the participants may a cqu i r e associations
between segments of the stimulus patterns that precede the
key trial an d the key trial itself.
The third criterion pu t forth by Seger (1994) is that
implicit learning is an "incidental consequence of the type
and amount of processing performed on the stimu l i" (p.164 ).
a nd does not involve the processes used during conscious
hypothesis test ing . Seger (1994) proposes t h a t such an
interpretat ion can defend against t hos e arguments suggest ing
that t he part icipants have gained f ragmentary knowledge o f
t he rules t hat govern the ex perimen tal task (Dulany.
Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Perruchet, Gallego & Savy, 1990;
Shanks & St . J o hn , 1.994) . Because the participants have not
acqui red their information through hypothesis testing
(conscious pathways), one might conclude that an independent
and unconscious pathway was used .
Evidence for unconscious or i mplicit learning can be
best il l us t r a t e d with the work o f Reber (1967 , 1976) and
Reber and Lewis (19 77 ). I n one of his earliest studies,
Reber (1967) showed participants exemplary strings of a
l:u le-governed artificial grammar . The participants,
however, were not informed that the grammar was founded on a
set of rules . lns tead, they were instructed to use rote
rehearsal tactics to memorize the strings they were shown .
Resu l ts demonst rated that those participants required to
memorize the rule-governed strings improved across trials ,
Control partic ipants, who were given strings of random
letters with no underlying set of rules. showed no marked
improvement in memorizing the letter strings . Despite the
neutrality of the i nstructions, t he experimental
participants appeared to become sensitive to the rules that
governed the artificial g rammar . Reber (1967 ) concluded
t hat participants l e a rn t o use t he structural relationships
that exist in a compl ex stimul us envi ronme nt , and u s e t ha t
information t o d i r e ct their c hoices . This find ing has been
supported by others prOVidi ng evidence that a t some level
the u ncons cious is capab.Lu of a cquiring new informat ion
(Morgan & Newpor t , 1981 ; Dulanyet a l . , 1984 ).
Si mila rly , Broadbent and colleagues have demo ns t r a t ed
that participant s c an implicit ly l e a r n t he complex r.nee
gov erning a n economic /produc tion simulation. I n a series of
studies, participants were g iven a hypothetical
manufactur ing dilemma Whereby they were required to
manipulate variables like wages and worke r output i n orde r
t o y ield a satisfactory p r odu c t i on s t a nda r d . Unknown t o the
participants, the simulation ope ra ted on ... set of
so phisticated ru les t ha t re la ted variab les to each other.
Consequent ly, these rules wou l d hav e t o be k no wn in o r der to
ac hieve the r equ i r e d production standard . Re su l t s sh owed
t hat the partic i pa nt s acquired the c ompl e x rules. The
ac qu isi tion appeared to be i mplic i t as they had no conscious
knowledge of those ru les (Br oa dben t & Aston , 1978 ; Be rry &
Broadbent , 1984 ; Broadbent, Fi tzgera ld , & Broad bent , 19 86 ) .
I mplicit learning Versu6 Ex plicit I ,earning
The studies mentioned above involved t he with'nolding of
specif ic i ns t ru c tions and information to the pa rt icipants .
The instructions were sufficiently vag ue to i nsure the
pa rticipants would not be motiva ted to l oo k for exis ting
patterns and regularities. Given the ev idence fo!
unconscious o r implicit l e a r n i ng under these c o ndit ions,
Reber and Millward (1 96 8) set out t o de t e rmi ne wha t effect
expl icit instructions, and c onsequently, explicit learning,
would hav e on the performance of individuals . More
specifically, would participants given explicit
instructions, as compared t o those given vague i ns t r u ct i ons ,
be at an advantage? Or , put different ly , would part icipants
learning explicitly ou t perform those l e a r n i ng implicitly?
Reber and Millward (196 8) used a probability learning
pa radigm. part icipants were required to indicate which of a
number of lights would domi nate in brigh t ne s s o ver a series
of trials . One g roup was give n expl icit i nstructions with
r e s pe ct to the f r equ en cy a nd probabi lity ru les that governed
t he task ; the othe r group was no t given a ny specific
i n formation . Contrary to expectations , the g roup which
received specific inst ructioos r e ga r d i ng t he rul es did not
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pe rform any better than the gr oup that r e c e i ved on l y vague
ins tructions . More impor tant ly, the par t i ci pan t s r e ce i ving
sp e c i fi c i nstructions reported t hat a lthough the
instructions they were g iven were precise and r elia b l e, t hey
were not au f f I c i.e nt , Actua l experience wi th the task wa s
what part i cipant s reported r e l ying on most heavi ly (Reber &
Millward , 1968 ).
It would ap pear that in tasks that employ f r e qu ency and
probability rules , co nscious p roceaees (e xpl i ci t) are not as
efficient as unconscious processes (imp lici t) at Le a'rn.lnq
information . Actual experience with the task may be more
be neficial to the part icipants than exposure to co mplex and
potentially confusing rule s . This proposition was e luded to
by Rebe r (19 76 ) . In his study , two groups wer e r equi r ed to
memor ize ex empla r s f r om an a r tificial g r ammar . Howeve r , one
group was explicitly i nst ru cte d t o look for the s tructu re
that guided t he grammar whereas the other gr oup wa s given
instructions tha t were vague. During the test phase ,
partic i pants were asked to assess t he g rammatical
correctness (within t he co nstraints of the artificial
grammar) of novel s tri ngs. participan ts who wer e give n
ex p licit instructi ons p erforme d more po o r l y than t hos e g i ven
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vague instruct ions . The s e pa r t i cipant s took l onge r to learn
the e xempla r s, pe rforme d more p o orly on the grammatical
correctness task, a nd i nduced r u l es that were not c lose t o
those b e i ng employed in the artificial grammar .
Sophi stication o f t he I mp] ic i t Te a rn j ng Syst em
I n the learning experiments desc ribed s o f a r ,
participants demons trated their knowledge t h r ough improved
p e rfo rmance, but they were unable to verbal i ze those ru l es
that were presumably a ccount ing for their performance. What
i s the natu re of the l earning t a s k that makes unconscdoua
p r oce s s i ng a more l i ke l y option than conscious processing?
Sege r (1994) notes that a ll of t he st imu lus struc t ures
employed fo r impl icit l earni ng studies are complex, in fact ,
so complex that participants cannot verbal ize t he pa tterns
r espon s i bl e f or perf ormance change. It is possible that
i mplicit learning processes f u nction i dea lly on ly with those
p atterns that are highl y complex. This is not an
un reasonable assumption g iven that simple pat ter ns would be
more likely to become known ex plicitly through no t icing t he
p at te r n iucident a l ly or e ng a ging i n conscious hypothesis
t esting (s e ge r, 199 4). Whether the process is inciden t a l or
a func t ion o f conscious h ypothe sis tes t ing , Seger (1994 )
1 2
believes t h a t simple patterns and rules a r e obv ious enough
to be pi ck e d up b y the conscio us.
I n ad dition, the cognitive unconscious appears to be
adept at processing compl ex information than the
conscious. As was demonst ra ted by Reber a nd Millward
(1968), who invest igated the effects of e xplicit versus
vague instructions, implicit p r oce s s i ng h e l d an advantage
over expl icit pro ce s sing . Th e opinion t hat imp l icit
processes are su perior to ex p l icit processes when stimuli
are composed of complex cont i ngencies is also h eld by
Lewi cki and co lleagues. Lewicki et al. (1992) b e liev e that
the r e search to date indicates that unco nscious acqu is ition
processes a r e no t only f a s t er . but structurally more
sophisticated than co nscious processes. I n ad d i tion . t hey
con tend that unconscious processes allow for .. t he
development of procedura l knowledge tha t i s unknown t o
conscious awareness no t merely be cause it has b e en e ncoded
... t hr ou gh channels tha t are independent f rom
consciousness. This k n owl ed g e is fundamentally inaccessible
to t he co nscious because it involves a more advanced and
structurally mor e complex organiza tion than could be h andl e d
by consciously control led thinking " {Lewi cki et al ., 1992;
1 3
p. 796). This i s precisely the position that is defended by
Seger f1994).
Despite Lewicki (1992) and Seger's (1994) suppo r t for
the sophisticacion of implicit pr o cess i n g , neither offer a
mechanism explaining h ow or when implicit learning i s lik e l y
to occur . Specificat ion of such a mechanism might f oste r an
understanding o f impl icit l e a rn i n g . As an initial attempt,
it is proposed that bo th imp licit and e xplicit l e arn i ng
occur in parallel, with the observed process be ing t:hat
which ac qui res the necessary information most quickly.
Whether that process is exp licit or imp licit would most
likely depend o n the complex ity l e vel o f the task.
pef jnjng Unconscious proc e s s e 5 as " S~
Fro m the e v i denc e p r e s e n t ed above , it appears that the
unconscious is ca pab le of proe..es :'3 ~ng i n formation, an d that
huma ns are cap able of using the information which has been
ac q uired implicitly . I n other words, t he unconscious
appears to be " s mart " . I t i s exactly this conclusion t hat
has sparked t he recent debates between those who su pport a
smart unconsc ious and t hose who d o not . It is necessary to
note he re what defines a • s mart " p rocess. According t o
Lof tus a n d Klinger (1 992), smart processes can be
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ca tegorized i n d iffe rent way s . On e factor e e scr me c by
Lof t u s an d Kl inger (1992) i s cer t a i nl y not n e w. Advocated
by Greenwa l d (19921, a -s mar t- me n t a l proce s s can be
de f ined as one that i s complex . I f we were to pola rize, t he
analysis of bas i c st imuli l i k e line s a nd angles woul d fall
on the simplist i c end of t h e continuum. and t he more
int r i ca t.e a nalys is or: mult i - s t rin g wor ds and thei r rel a tio ns
wou l d fall on the co mplex e n d (Gr e en wa l d, 1992 ) . Thus t he
? r o c e s s i n g of pa t.te r ns i nt o ab stract and sophistica t ed
i n f o rmat i o n wou l d c o ns ti t u t e a s ma r t p r oces s (Loftu s &.
Klinger. 19 92 ) .
Ano t h e r f a ct or , descr ibed by Lof tus and Kli nger (1992),
t ha t may de em a process "smart" , is t he ability to d ea l with
nove l s itua t i o ns . Th us , a p r oces s tha t ca n f unct ionally
ada p t to a n a t yp ic a l si tu a t i on wou ld b e consider ed "s mar t e r -
than one t hat cannot make c r eat i v e use of r e s our ce s t o sol ve
a n ovel d ilemma.
Imp l i c i t P roces ses i n t h e Implicit learni n g pa rad igm
In t he i mplicit lea rn i ng p a r ad i gm , st i muli a re ab ove
t h e t hr e s h ol d for d etection (sup r a limi nal) . That is ,
pa rt i cip a nts a re awa re of the pre se nc e of t .he st i muli .
Howeve r, t hey are unaware of t he r elat i onship {s ) between
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those stimuli and the required responses . A clear example
of s upraliminal i nf o rma t i on and unconscious learning is the
wor k of Reber (1967 ; 1989). In his ar t if i cial gramma r and
probabil i ty l ea r ni ng paradigms , the s t i muli are never masked
or h idden from t he part icipants . However . the r elationships
between t he stimul i in these paradigms are inconspicuous ,
and it f.a t hese relationships that the pa rt i cipant s must
learn, po s sib l y at an unconsc ious l eve l , in order to so l v e
subsequent tasks .
Lewicki a nd co lleaguea (1987; 1988) ha ve al so u s ed t he
prObability learning paradigm t o invest igate implic it
processes . In the pattern l e ar n i ng exp e r i ments ,
part icipants are seated in front of a computer screen which
is divided into fo u r quadrant'. At se t intervals, t he
target stimulus can appear in anyone of the f our quadrants .
The ir j ob i s to indicate, as quickly as possible following
targe t exposure, in which o f the four quadrants the targets
appeared . The target l oc a t i on is not random but governed by
a set of complex ru les . The position of the target i n Borne
of the preceding t r i a l s de termines where the targe t ehouLd
appear in the final key trial o f a sequence .
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Over trials the participants show improvement as their
response rates to target posit ion become quicker and their
success rates h igher; clearly they are becoming s ensi tive to
t he ru l e s upon whi ch the sequences are go verned (Le wi cki et
al. , 1987 ; Lewicki , Hill, & Bizot , 1988) . Moreover, once
the trials are c ompleted and the participants are r equired
t o indicate to the e x pe rimenter what rules were us e d, they
are unable to v e rb a l i ze the actual set o f rules up on which
the pa ttern was based , This is to say that there is a
di s s ociat i on b etween the actual performance and the
awareness of the r u l e s t ha t guided performance .
Al ternatively, a s Greenwald (1992) would put i t, t he re i s a
lack or f a ilu r e of introspection; this can be taken as
evi denc e for uncons c ious learning (Lewi c ki et al., 1987 ;
1988 ) .
Criticisms and Imposi ng Criteria
The da ta and conclusions reached by both Reber a nd
Lewicki and colleagues , a lthough impress i ve, are
controversial. Some resear~hers claim t ha t the results
ob tained by Reber (1967 ; 19 77 ) and Lewicki et al . (1987;
1988) are the due t o participants having acquired a partial
conscious know l edge of the patterns that deve lop during the
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exper imental procedure s . I n some s tud i e s. experimenters
have found t hat part i cipa nt s co ul d report f r agme nt s o f t he
complex rules t hat governed the expe rimental patterns
(Dul a ny e t a l ., 19 84 ; Perru che t et al . , 199 0; Br ooks &
Vokey , 1989 ) . It c ou ld be the case that the ru les governing
those particu lar t asks were too obvious or simplistic an d,
thus, easily d i s ce r ned by the conscious.
Shanks and St . J ohn (1994 ) have r e ce n t l y pr op osed two
criteria they ar gue must be met in order to co nclude that
unconscious l e ar n ing has taken p l ace . Fi r st , t he
Inf orma t i on Criterion r equi res t he experimen ter to e s t ablis h
that the i nfo rmat i on so ught i n the awa reness test (t ha t is ,
the tes t t hat wi ll assess whe t h e r o r not t he subjec t i s
aware of the rules that under l ie the task t he y h av e
compl eted) i s indeed t he information t hat is r e s p ons i b l e for
t he performance change i n the participa nts. Second, the
s e ns i t i v i ty Cr i t e rion r equi r e s that the awareness tes t be
sens itive, o r able to p ick up on a l l of the r ele v an t
consc ious i n forma tion po s se s s e d by t he sUb j e c t . It is
poss i b le that a pe rformance test is qu ite sensi tive to
conscious i nformation , where a s an awa reness tes t is not
s ens i t ive t o t hat s ame i nformat i on (Shanks & St. John,
1 8
1994) . The e nd resul t then , is ap parent unconscious
l e arni ng that should be a t tributed to conscious process e s .
From t he pe r speccI ve of Shanks and St . J ohn (1994 ), the
research of Lewicki et ar . (1987 ) doe s no t satisfy the above
mentioned crite ria . In the i r pattern l ear ning study ,
Lewicki et a l . 1198 7 ) showed partic i pants nonrandom
sequences at targets on a c omputer screen divided into tour
quad rants . The pa rticipan ts were r e qu i r ed t o press the
button t hat co rresp ond ed wi t h t he quadr a nt i n which the
targ e t app e a r ed as soon a s t he y we r e aware at t he t a r get
l oca t i on . pa r tic i pant s were ex po s ed to twe lve hou r- l on g
sessions , d i v i d ed into f our s egment s by short breaks . Each
segment co nsisted o f 96 b l oc ks, wi t h each b l o ck composed of
six s i mpl e trials fol lowed by one complex matrix s c anning
trial . On a simple trial, t he target a ppeared. cle a r ly in
one o f t he f our quadrants . On the complex trial , the t arget
was s bovn a gainst a back - drop of visual noise It he t a r ge t
was embedded in a 36 d i g i t dis t r a c t er d i splay) mak i ng i t
more diff i cul t f or t he su b ject t o de t e c t . Unkno wn to t he
pa rt icipants , t he position o f the target on t h i s «cce pt ex ''
tria l was a f unct i on o f the position o f t h e t a r ge t s on f ou r
of t he s ix pre c:f!ding "s i mpl e" trial s ( I , 3 , 4 , and 6) . The
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positions of the targ et on the r emaining two " s i mp l e " trial s
(2 and 5) we r e ran dom a nd irrelevant in determ ini ng t he
position o f t h e t a r ge t o n the compl ex t r i a l .
Th i s re lation wa s rathe r complicated. No n e t hel e s s , the
participants a ppeare d to become seneitive to the nonrandom
na ture of the ta rget p r e s ent a tions as e vid e n c ed by decr e a sed
response l a t e n c i e s over t ria ls. I n a d di tion, whe n asse sse d
on t he awareness t est, the pa r t i c ipa n t s we r e un a b l e to
ve rbal i z.e t he co mp l e x relati onship that determin e d t he
pla c e ment: o f the target o n key (compl e x) t rial s - t here was
complete d issoc i a t ion be t ween perfo rmanc e and aware ness.
Shan k s a nd S t. J ohn (1994) , ho wever, a r gue that these
conclus ion s are i ncor r e ct. The p r o b l e m lies i n what Shanks
a nd St . J o hn (1 99 4) r efer to as "micro-rules", that e na b led
t h e participants to acquire a fragmentary knowledge o f the
rules gover nin g the sequences. In r eviewi ng t h e fou r ke y
simple t ria ls , Shank s and St. John (199 11) f ound that al thou gh
t horough k no wledge of t he sequenc e gu a rant eed c e rta i n t y
a bout t h e target p l a c e me nt i n t he seventh tria l, the sixth
t r i a l a l one wa s i n fo rm a tiv e e n ough to increase t h e
probab i l ity of gu e s s i ng co rrect l y wh ich qu a dran t the target
would appear, t h us, decreas ing t he r e a c t i on t i me . Such
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fragmenta ry rules, if consciously acquired and implemented,
wou l d increase the probabil i t y o f r e sponding corre ctly and
quickly o n t he seventh key t rial . Th us , t h e i nformation
that Lewicki et al . (1 9 8 7 ) were looking for t h r ou g h t h e
awareness test may not be the information that was
r e spon s ible f o r t h e change in performance . That is , there
would appear t o b e a v iola t ion of t he I n f o rma t i o n Cri te r i o n .
With respect to the Sensit ivity Criter ion, Shanks and
St . J oh n (19 94 ) question whether t h e performance and
a wa eene s a teste employed by Lewicki e t a l . (1 9 8 7) were
matched with respect to the c o nsciou s information they we re
able to pick up . That is , it c o u l d be the case t ha t the
performance t e s t was sensitive to the conscious i n f o rmat i o n
acquire d t h rou g h f ragmentary rules , but the awareness test
could not tap Incc this conscious infonnat ion . As a resu l t,
the ques tions posed d uring the awareness test wou ld not be
rel evant to tl'.e information employed by the participants.
and that information would not be revealed by the
participants during quest "Loning . Thus, dissociation co u l d
have been erroneously attributed to u n c o n s c i ou s acquisition
of infor,'lIation .
Another study by Lewicki (1986) has et.ec been s u b j e c t e d
to the scrutiny of Shanks and St . John (J.994 ). I n order to
d ecemunc whether information about covariations could be
learned i mp lic i t l y, Lew icki (J.96'6) exposed participants t o
pictures of peoples' faces. The experimental man ipulation
consist.ed of the covariation cecween hair length and
personality characteristics on the acquisition trials . Al l
participants saw pictures of people with both short and long
hair, as well as a brief personality description . The
covariat ion wi th personality was manipulated i n such a way
that half the participants were exposed to long-haired
people whose a ccompanying personality descripticn e l u d e d t o
a "kind" q uality, and the other half we re exposed to short -
haired people whose accompanying description eluded to a
" capable ~ quality .
During the test phase, participants were shown a new
set of pictures and asked to agree or disagree wi th
statements that categorized the people in t hose pictures as
either "kind" or ~capable". Results indicated t h a t
part i cipants were more l ikely to confirm t h e categorization
when it was co nsistent with the covariation upon which they
had been exposed to during the acquisition phase. These
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results were taken as evxeence that ene participants hat1
uncon s cious l y e cqu t red t he relevant cov ariation between hai r
length and personality .
Finally, du ring the awareness test, pa r ticipants were
asked if chey were aware of a ny c o-oc curr ence be t ween the
ps ychological de script o.:= f')f t he s timulus pe ople and any o f
their physica l f eatures . The pa r ticipan ts gave no
indic a tion t hat they were consciously aware of the existing
re l at ions hip be t ween h a i r and pers ona lit y suggest i ng t hat
the cova r i a t i on had been acqui r ed by the partic i pants
unconsciously . Sh,lnks and St . John (1994 ) , ho weve r , a rg ue
t hat there i s no evide nc e that Lewi ck i (1986 ) has satisfied
t he Sen sitivity Cri t eria . As was the c ri t icis m of Lewi cki
e t al . (1987), it cou l d be t ha t the ac quisi tion tes t was far
more s ensitive t o t he part iclpanr:;; ' c onsc i ous knOWledge tha n
wa s the awareness tes t.
In an attempt t o replicate the wor k o f Le wi ck i e t a l .
(1986 ). Stadler (1 989 ) conducted a similar s t udy . Acco rding
to Shanks and St . John (1994 ) , t h e Sensitivity a nd
I nf o rmat.Lon Cri te r ia were met . The s tudy r epl i cated the
LE: /dcki e t a l . ( 1987j t arget location parad i gm wi th one
exceptacn , instead o f the standa r d "que s t i on an d an swer"
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styl e awareness test, Stad ler (1989 ) empl oyed a trans fe r
t est cal led a ~prediction task".
I n the predic tion t ask, the pa r t i cipa n t s were show n
similar b locks o f s even tria l s where the t arge t locat ion on
the s eventh compl ex trial co u l d be de termi n ed b y the
sequence of four pre ced i ng s i mple trials . On t he seventh
trial, ho weve r, the pa r ticipants were f a c ed no t with an
embedded target , but f ou r question marks placed in the four
loca tions t ha t co uld possibly house t he target. The
participants were then requi r ed t o gue s s , without
ex perimenter feedback, which of t he f our quadrants the
t arget woul d appear .
Because t his p redicti on t a s k made i t poss i b le fo r the
pa r t i c i pa nt s t o use whatever consc ious kno wledge t h ey ha d
a cquired (s equ ential or f ragm en t a ry ), the Information
Cri t e r ia was satisfie d . The experimenter would not be
restrict:.i ng awareness quest ions t o aspects that were not
r e sp ons i ble for performance change . In addition , because
t he prediction t ask was ve ry similar to the learning trial s ,
Shanks and St . John (1994) con t end that the Sensi t ivity
Cri t eria was met , a s both the ac quisition a nd the a wa reness
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t est would pick up on the same amount of cons c i ous knowledge.
Stadler (19 89) replicated the finding o f Lewi cki e c al .
(19 86) tha t over trials reaction time on complex target
tria l s s ignificantly decreased . Pe r fo rmance on the
prediction (awa r ene s s) t ask revealed the participants could
correctly predic t t a r get location only 11 t o 13 times out of
48 . Thus , there was no ev idence f or t he subject' s awarenes s
of the rul es. Shanks and St . John (199 4) su g ges t that t he
complexity of t he prediction task may hav e caused the
pa rticipa n t s t o forget what they had previously learned, due
t o interferenc e . An alternati ve explanation could be that
the participants acquired the relevant i nformat ion
implicitly during t he acquisition phase , but were unable to
t r ans f e r that informat ion t o the novel complex trial use d in
the predic tion t a s k .
The work of Reber (1967) a nd Reber and Lewis (1977) has
no t escaped t h e cri t i cisms of Shanks and St . John (1994 ).
In the typical gr amma r learning paradigm, part i cipants are
required to memorize a s eries of letter s t ri ngs tha t are
generated from a rule-driven artificial grammar . A control
group is required to memorize similar, bu t random, letter
strings . pa r ticipants are then tested on novel strings .
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They a r e r eq ui r ed to i n di c a t e to the ex per imenter whether or
not the s tri ng is -e e e e e ee » within the constraints o f t he
artif icial g rammar or rules t hey have acqui red .
participants in the rule-governed group perform well above
chance and are unable to verbally report the rules used to
so l ve the task . The conclu s i on drawn i n these studies is
t hat the part ic i pants have used an un conscious rule
i nduc t i on mechanism.
With respect t o the Se nsit ivity Criteria, Shanks and
St. John (1994 ) are no t convi nced that a retrospective
ve rbal r epo r t is sensitive enough to tes t the c on s c i ous
kn owl edg e o f ru les. An a lternative could be c on cu r r e nt
t hinking aloud an d recogni tion t ests t o increase the
Sensitivity be t ween acqu i sition and awar ene s s (Sha nks & St .
John , 1994 ). With r e spe ct to t he v i ol a t i on o f the
Informat ion Criteria, Shanks and St . John (1994) sugge s t
t ha t wi thin t he artificial grammar pa radigm, the
pa r t i cipan t s may be l e a r ni ng some thing other t han rules
during the tra ining trials. Thus, t o ask the pa rticipan t s
t o reveal wh at they h av e l e a rned about rules d uri n g the
awareness test wi ll i n evitably r e sul t i n f a l s e conclus ions .
Sh an ks and St . J ohn (1994 ) sugge s t t hat the pa rtici;?ants in
"
these studies acquire the information abou t the task over
trial s v i a " . . . s i mpl e memory mechanisms that c o llect
frequency s t a ti s tics . . . " on occurring se quenc e s .
Insuri 09 c ontonn i ty to Iotorma t j on and Sensiti vity CTH e r; a
It would ap pear that t h e Information and Sen s i tivity
Cr i t eria a r e essential t o researchers who wi sh to expl ore
unconsc ious l ea r n ing. To ensure that ne i ther o f these
cri t e r i a are viol a t ed . Shanks a nd St. J ohn (1 99 4) sugge s t
t ha t e i ther t he tes t of awarene ss must be s ens i t i ve to all
po tent i a lly releva nt con s cious information or be at l e as t a s
s e ns it i ve as t he pe r formanc e t e s t i n de tect ing po t ent i ally
rele va nt cons cious information . The best so l u t ion is t o
make t he awareness t e s t a s simi l ar as poss ible to t he
performance test with r espect t o r e tri eval co ntext . Howev e r,
the tests should dif fer i n t erms o f i n s t ruc t i ons (Shanks &
St . J oh n, 1994) . The dnetruct.L one fo r the a wa r e ne ss test
should encourage the participants t o r etrieve as much
i nformation as possib le . Given this format , it is un likely
that t he part i c i pants would retrieve more cons cious
inf o rmat ion on the performance test than the awareness test
because the i nstructions on t he awareness test are
particularly motivat ing (Sha nks & St . John, 1994 ) .
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A Deye lQpmenta l Perspective Qf UncpnsciQus l e a rn i n g
From a developmental perspective , it i s un qu e stionab le
that pr e -v e r ba l children learn wi t ho u t ve r ba l awareness.
For example , a t presc hool age it is relat i v e l y ee-ry t o
d emons trate t ha t grammat i cal i nformat i on is acqui r ed
int r ins i ca l ly . I n he r c l assic ·wug· s t u dy , Berko (1958)
demonstrated that children as young a s pre- schoo l age
clearly possess knOWl edg e of mOl."phological ru les and can
transfer that knowledge t o nove l artificial words . By
preschool children have acquired and are ca pab l e o f u sing
complex gramnar ru l es without actually be i ng aware of the
underlying s t ru c t ur e o f t hose rules , t hus indica t i ng
imp l i ci t a cquisit i on o f this linguistic kn owledge . Bas ed o n
t he artificial grarrmar studies of Reber (1 967 , 19 77 ) and the
pattern lea rn i ng and co variation s tudi es o f Lewicki et
a!. (1986, 1987 , 1988 ) , the goal of the present s tudy i s to
d e termine whe ther or not older ch ildren ha ve t he ability to
learn co va r iation informat ion implicitly o r exp licitl y .
The re is e vidence fo r ch ildren unde rs tanding
co variations at a very ear l y ag e . Kuhn , Amsel, and
O'Loughlan (1988 ) ca r ried ou t a se t of e xpe rime nt s to
evalua te participants ab ility to understand t he r ela t i onsh i p
2 8
between antecedent and outcome. In t he s e experiments, it
was demonstrated tha t children as young as e ight years old
were capable of unde rstanding the covarf.ee ron between
antecedent (cause ) and outcome (effect) when directed to the
realtionship and asked t o rate t he extent t o which the
presence or absence o f a variable (e .g . component of a stain
r emoval mi xture) will effect ou t c ome (e. g . whether or not
the stain is removed) (Kuhn et al ., 1988) .
The ability of children to understand covariations is
also evidenced in a s tudy by Sod ian (1991 ) (cited i n
Ruffman, Perner, Olson, &. Doherty, 1993) . Children were
told the story of a charac ter trying to determine whether
the size of a tennis racket or the materials it was made
·f r om would affect t he manner in which the racket co uld be
used to serve a ball. In the s tory, the cha racter d evelop ed
an e xperiment whereby di ff e r en t people made serves with
r ackets that varied on one d imension while the o ther was
held constant. At t he e nd of the characte r 's experiment,
the ch i ldren were shown r atings of each of t he rackets . The
children were t h en r equ i r ed to explain t o the experimente r
ho w each rated racket ei t her support ed or re f u t ed t he
hypothesis tha t i t wa s size a lone that had t he g r eate s t
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e f fe ct on serve . That i s , t he children wer e r equ i r ed to
demons trate an understanding o f the covariation between a
focal variable (s i ze ) an d an optimum outcome (h igh quality
serve) in order t o provide supporting evidence for a
hypothesis . Re s u l t s i ndicated that by the age of eight,
more than ha lf o f the ch ildren were proficient at
verbal izing an understanding o f the r elationship .
In a s imilar study , Ruffman et a l. (1993) set out to
determine a t what age children could unde rstand covariations
that support ed a hypothesis in favour of a part i cu l a r cause
for an observed effect. Four and five year old children
were fi rs t introduced to a character " s a l l y" who left to "go
play" shortly before the t a s k wa s to begin. The children
were t he n show n p i c t ure s of boys "eating" e ither red or
green food ; actual l y , the food was represented by piec es of
co loured pa per l a i d ne xt t o the p ictures . Al l of t he boys
who were ea ting r ed f ood had a f u ll set of healthy teeth .
Howeve r , t hos e who were eating g reen f ood had several of
the ir t e e t h missing . The children were fi rs t asked to
assess t he covarf.atdon evide nce by t e l ling the exper imenter
wh i c h f ood makes k ids t eeth fall out . All o f the children
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answered co rrectly, associat ing t he correct colou r f ood with
tooth loss .
In t he s e c ond phase, the children were told that
"Sa l l y " would be returning . The experimenter t hEm " faked "
the ev idence so that it now looked like t he red food caused
tooth loss and the green food resulted in healthy t eeth .
The children were then asked wha t "Sa l ly's" concl usion would
be given t ha t t he e vidence wa s n ow f aked . A cont rol
ques tion fo l lowed in orde r to d e t ermine whether or not t he
children had change d thei r hyp othe se s. in light o f t he f a ked
evidence even t hough they we re t ol d b y the ex pe r ime nte r what
hypothe sis was "t ru e". The r e sults i nd i cated that t he five
year a Ids performed wel l above chance, succassfully
determining that changing the covardeus.oa evidence ....ould
alter t he hypothesis fo r "s a l l y " , but not for themselves .
The research of Kuhn et a l . (1988), Sodian 119911 and
Ruffman et al . (1 993 ) are by n o means indicative o f
children's a b ility t o .!Ioc qu i r e covariation i nforma t ion
i mplic i t l y . I n fact, t he tasks adop ted i n both s t u d ies were
quite explicit, wi t h t he child r en clearly di r ected to the
exis t ence o f a covariation Iev t dence) with an accompan y i ng
nypo t n e e f s . I t does, howeve r , demonst ra te t ha t ve ry young
31
children can ap preciate the conce p t that two variables (size
and serve quality or food co lour and tooth loss ) must always
occur togethe r in o rder to maintain a supported hypothesis.
To date, there is li t t l e publis he d material
investigating children 's unconscious acquisi tion of
covariation information . However, i n an unpublished
manuscript, czyzewska, Hi ll and Lewicki (1991 ) found that
four and five year old children were able to i mplici t l y
l e ar n a covariation between the c lothing colour of chi ldren
presented on posters and general categories (phys ically
act ive or physically pass ive) of their activities (cited in
Lewicki et al., 1992). Based on these findings , Lewicki ee
al . (1992) concluded that very y oung children are capable of
learning complex co ntingencies unconsciously .
More specific to the present study i s the work of
Rabinowitz and Howe (1994). In Expe r i ment 2, t hey looked at
the role of verba l awareness and implicit learning i n the
ac quisition of the midd le concep t (that i s , the conceptual
midd le as op posed to the posi tional middle). part icipants
r ang i ng i n age from 7 to 10 yea r s old were shown stimulus
sets of three i t ems ea ch , f rom which t hey wer e r e qu i r ed to
select the c o n cep tua l "middle " item. The pre t r a i ni ng sets
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consisted o f two s ets each representing area (masoni te
squares), number (number of dots on a card), an d height
(wooden dowe l s ). Of these sets, paxt.Lodpant.e were
p retrained on either one or two se ts within the same
d imension , or t wo sets from dif fe rent d i men s i ons .
Pa rticipants were i nstruct ed t hat t hey would be shown three
items in a set , an d f rom that set they were to select the
"cor r e c t " thing. They were not told the rule that made one
item -ccreect e , but were told whether or no t they had made
the correc t ch oice.
After criterion had been r e a che d on pretraining, t he
chi ldren were exposed to 18 test sets (the t r ans f e r task )
representing physical d imensions (colour , gap s ize in the
arc of a circle, e l lipse shape) and cognitive dime ns i ons
(age, body parts, story sequence). These dimens ions were
novel and differed f ro m those t he y h a d been trained on, but
still represented the mi ddle rule. I n transfer, t he
c hildr en were told that they wou l d view some new items, and
if they thought a bout wha t they had learned in the previous
task t hey would be able to determine the correct response.
They were not tol d whether they wer e right or wrong on the
transfer tests . Once the t rans fer t a sk was completed, t he
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children were asked how they had solved the problem. Those
children who indicated that the solution was "middle " or
"second" we r e classif ied as "e xt r i n s i c learners " , as they
had ve rba lly de s c r i bed the middle r u l e , while those who
could give no i nd i ca t i on were classified as "intrinsic
learners" .
Both children classified as "intrinsic" a nd "extrinsic"
learners wexe ab le to r ea ch criterion du ring p retraining.
Such a finding provides further support for Lewicki et al .
(199:2) who purport that c h ildren are capable of ldarning
complex contingencies i nt r i ns i cally . However, Rabinowitz
and Howe (1994) also f ound t ha t i n t rinsic learners r e qu ired
more t rials to reach c rit e r ion than those participants
cl<'lssified as extrinsic learners. consequently , i t is
questionable whether o r no t the c ogn i t i v e unconscious i s
capable o f operating f a s ter than the conscious, which i s a
con tention of Lewi cki et a r . (1992 ).
With respect t o verbal awareness for the mid dle rule ,
ch ildr e n who were pre trai ned on two t rain ing s e t s (either
sa me or d ifferen t dimens ions) we r e more l ike l y than children
t rained on only on e training-set to extract t he mi ddl e rule
and demonst rate this knowledge with ve rbal awareness.
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Moreover, only t hos e pa rticipants who demonstrated verbal
awareness of the mi ddl e ru le (tha t is, the explicit
l e arne r s) we r e able eo trans fer that rule on the test
t rials. I f, as Lof tus and Klinger (1 992 ) c ontend , that a
smart cognitive p r oce s s i s o ne that ca n deal flexi bly with
no vel s itua t ions Un thi s case , t he transfer t ask) then
co nscious learners , within the Rabinowitz and Howe (1994)
pa radigm, were smart . Unfortunately, the poo r transfer
pe r fo rma nce of t he imp lici t learne r s l en d s n o such evide nce
fo r a smart unconscious . These r e su l t s ap pear to f avou r
Greenwa ld (1992 ) an d a relat i ve ly u ns oph i sticated
unconsc ious .
Transfer Taa k as a Me t bpd f o r In c reaaing s e nsi ti v i t y
The transfer task ad opted by Rab inow i tz and Howe (1 994)
has merit as a mechanism to ad dress the Sen s i tivi ty
Criterion . Shanks and St . John (199 4) conte nd tha t the
sens i tivi ty Criterion is violated when the evarenese test
cannot detect ccaectcue inf o rmat i on that may be responsible
fo r t he change i n performance . By using a t r an s fer task, an
ad di t ional so u rce of i n f orma t i on be comes av ailabl e which ca n
be co mpa red wi th t ha t obtai ne d f r om the awa reness test .
Si nce the transfer test. employs the same met hodol ogy as the
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t raining task, a " s ens Lt.Ive" performance measure would also
impact conclusions .
The introduct ion of the transfer task p r ov i d e s
a lternat ives f o r interpreting the results. With a transfer
task , a new set of s t imuli a re shown t o the participants.
Although the stimuli are new, the "rule" is sti l l the same
as that which was used to solve the pretraining t.aek . using
this paradigm, t he re are several possible outcomes . First ,
part icipants c ou ld trans fer and di s p l ay ve rbal awareness,
thus showing a smart conscious that can deal flexibly with
novel situations. Second, participants may be able to
t ransfer bu t be unable to demonstrate verbal awareness .
Such a finding would provide evidence for a smar t
unconecdoue that can transfer informa tion independent of
conscious awareness . Third, pa r t i c i pa nt s may be unable to
transfer but be ab le to demonstrate verbal awareness. This
would be indicative of a rather dumb conscious. Finally,
pa rtici pants may be unable to transfer and unable to
demons t r a t e ve rba l awareness , consequently showing a d umb
uncons c i ous .
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Atria-Dugea Gajped by IJa "jP9 Chi ld participapts
Mos t s t ud ies o f implicit lear ning hav e invol ve d ad ult
pa rticipants an d highly comp l ex t a s ks (Berry & Broadbent ,
1984 ; Broadbent & Aston, 1978; Broadbent et al . , 19 86;
Lewicki et al. , 198 6, 1 987, 198 8, Reber e t al., 19 67, 19771 .
Clearly wi th an adult population, t h e l ea rning t ask empl oyed
wi ll be more co mp l ex than those used i n studies involving
ch ildren . A highly complex task carries wi t h i t the
opp o r tuni t y f or participants t o so lve the problem by me ans
other t ha n t hat intended by the expe rimenter. This p roblem
r esul t s in v iolat i on of t he Information Cr i t e rion put f orth
by Shanks and St . J ohn (1994) and is precisely the ba sis
upon which the s t ud i e s of Lewicki et a l. (19 86 , 1987 ) and
Rebe r (196 7; 1977 ) have been crit icized . The I n f orma t i on
Criterion requi res the expe rimenter t o establish that the
information sought through the awareness test is indeed t he
i n f o rmat ion responsible f or performance change in t he
participants (Sha nks & ae . J ohn , 1994 ) . By us ing a du l t
partic ipants, and the necessarily complex ceeks , firm
conclusions abou t i mp l icit learning are less like l y than
when the task empl oyed is l e s s complex . The complexity of
the task employed i n adult studies may provide pa rticipants
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wit.h cons c i ous knowledge of a lterna t i ve s olutions t hat t he
exper i menter d id not i n t en d and subs equent.ly i s no t access ed
th rough late r awa r e ne s s t e s ts . Wit h ch i l d part i c ipants, t.he
tasks err.pl oyed a re les s complex, r e lat i ve to t hose employed
wi th adul t pa rticipants . Fo r th i s reason , c h i l dr e n are
bet t e r part i cipants i n s t ud i e s that l ook at t he unc ons c i ous
C\cqu isi t i on o f i n form a t i on . By u s i ng child part i c i pa nt s ,
and simpler l earn i ng tasks for wh ich t he r e are f ewer
ec r ue t cne , i mproved pe rformance c an be at t r i bu ted to t he
i nt e nded r ul e wi t h greater co nfidence . In a ddi t i on , be cause
t he maj ority of implicit lea rning s t ud i es ha ve i nvolved
adul t populations, it i s i n t e r es ting to l ook at children i n
order t o determi ne what so r t of developme n t a l trends exist
i n implicit learning .
Overview
The pr e s e n t s tudy wa s de s i gned t o determine how
children in grade s fou r and five learn cova ria tions , and
whe t her t he numbe r o f irrel e vant d i mension s p r e s en t in
s t i mul us sets woul d fac i li t a t e implicit learning . Seger
(1994) , based on t:i ndi ngs reported by Lewi ck i e t a l . (l987 )
and Kush ner e t e f . (1991) , c onj ectured t hat i r re levant
a spe cts o f st imul i may be deal t with mor e e f fi cient ly by the
3.
imp licit sy stem. Sege r (1994 ) s pe culat ed t hOl t the reason
for thi s co uld be tha t t he explic i t t ho ug h t system ha s mor e
dif ficulty determining which stimuli can be ignored . The
implici t l ea rni n g system, on t he o ther h an d , appear-a to be
less affe ct ed by irre l ev an t i nforma t ion presu mably becaus e
i t c an determine the dependencies betwee n a larger numbe r o f
v a r iabl e s than the explici t system (Seger, 1994).
Alternative l y, i t may be that the explic i t l e a rni n g system
i s especially s e nsitive t o i rrelevant inf o rmat i on because
the explici t s ys tem en gages in hypothesis testing. For
examp le , it i s pos s ible t o genera te a l arge numbe r o f ne w
hyp ot he s e s when an i r rel ev a n t dimension i s ad d ed t o a
d i s criminat ion lea rning task (s ee Ghol son , 1980) .
The f ollowi ng p redictions a re ba sed on the conjecture
that t h e explicit sys t em engages in conscious hypothes is
test i ng thr oug h se ria l process ing qf stimulu s
ch a r ac t e ristics . Wi th eac h add i t i onal t wo-va lue d dimens i on
present in st imulus i tems , if all pos sible hyp ot he s e s a re
tested , the number o f hypotheses t o test increases by a
po wer o f two , t hus increasing the difficulty o f the t ask a nd
the amount of processing . The proc e s s i ng engaged in by the
implicit sys tem, on the othe r hand , i s conjectured t o b e
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associat i ve ' , perhaps automat i c , an d parallel . I n other
word s , each addi tional tw o - value d dime ns i ons p resen t in
s t imulus items woul d be p rocessed s i multa neous l y , o r in
parallel. Hen ce , t he amoun t o f processing r equired by the
implici t sys tem woul d no t incr e ase t o t he s ame extent as
that requi r ed by the ex p l icit s ys t em eng ag ing i n s e ria l
p r ocessing . Therefore , t he learni ng r a t e of t he implici t
system will decrease at a slower rate t han tha t of the
ex plicit sys t em as task difficulty increases .
Fourth - a nd fifth- g r a der s we r e chosen Ln light of t he
r e s e arch of Rabino wi t z a nd Howe (1994 ) an d the r e s u lts o f a
p ilot s tudy' , both of wh ich demons trated the d ifficulty that
thir d gr ade children have reach i ng c riterion , verb alizing
rules , a nd transferring i n f ormati on. In thei r investiga tion
o f t he role o f ve r baliza tion in t he acqui s ition of t he
middle co ncept, Ra binowitz a nd Howe (199 4) f oun d that the
percentage o f fo urth and fifth grade r s who wer e v e r bally
'1bel'l'\l.'O; of die llJ"~lDnenl due~ 11111 depend on associative prOCes.~illg, btu llult the prceesses involved in implicit
and explidl leamilll1: are differell/.
~!ll,kll.'lCdin dJepiIOl: lItudyproved lobeloocornplelt for the lrade tbree ebi1d ren wilhonly "" relll:bing
nilcriorl. it W"M lktcnninedthe gflllleJ IIllII1flIe Imll1dnol he repm;entalive lwe d on lUeh a poor success rate. Therefore,
Jra<J<: 0& ehildren W<:re choscnin.m.....
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aware (exp l i cit l e arn e r s ) differed significantly from third
g t"ade rs, with more fourth - an d fifth -graders t h a n t hi r d -
graders verbally stating the middle r ul e . Rabi nowitz and
Howe ( 1994 ) also showed that only t h ose c h ildr e n who
ve r ba l i zed the rule were able t o t r ansfer t he c o nc ept
t e s t trials . It was predicte d th at onl y those children who
demonstrated ve r b a l awareness of t h e cova r iation r ule would
be successful i n t he transfer t ask .
Given t he a ssumpt ion that t he i mplic i t learning s y s tem
engages i n paral l el processing and sub se quently appears to
be less a f f ec ted by irrelevant i nformation t han t he explicit
sys t e m, it was also predicted that the percentage of
partic i pan t s l earning implicitly (wi t hou t ver ba l awareness ),
a s c o mpa r e d to explicitly, would i n creas e as a function of
the number of i r r eleva n t t raining dimensions . In addition,
s i nce t he implici t learning system is assumed to be less
affected b y i r r e l evant information, i mpli cit learners
t r a i n ed on two irrelevant di me ns ions would be expected to
sh ow smal ler increases i n the number of t r ial s t o cr i t e rion
during training than explicit learners .
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Method
par t i cipan ts
The participants were 112 elementary s cho o l chi ldren .
Parental and school board consent were required in order for
chi ldren to participate. Children were chos e n from two
grade levels; those who did not reach criterion were
replaced . Sixty-one fourth - and 52 fifth graders were
needed to yield 48 children (24 male and 24 female) who
reached criterion at each grade . At the grade four level,
five children failed to reach criterion when trained on one
irrelevant dimension ; eight children failed to reach
criterion on two irrelevant d imensions . At the grade five
leve l , one child failed to reach criterion when trained on
one irrelevant dimension; t h ree children failed to reach
criterion on two irrelevant dimensions . The mean age of
grade four chi ldren was 114 .54 months with a standard
deviation of 4 .90 months ; the mean age of the grade f ive
chi ldren was 129 .48 months with a standard deviation of
19 . 8 3 months .
The design was a grade (four and five) by gender by
treatment (one and two irre levant dimensions on tra ining)
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f actor ial . Twelve p a r t i cip an t s we re quasi-randomly assigned
to each cel l . The d ependent vari a bles were errors to
criterion', t he number of correct r esp o nses made on t he
t ransfer task, res ponse latency o n t he criter~on run, mean
response l at e n cy during transfer, and verbal awareneaa .
SUml1li
.n:.a...ini.ns. The t reatment conditions diffe red in t he
training sets employed. I n both conditions , children were
trained on sets of thr ee stimuli varying in size (large or
small) a nd s hape (curved or straight) (see Figure la). Of
these three s timul i, only one represented t he covariation
between shape and size (e .g . , cu rved a nd large) . Of the
four possible combinations of size an d shape, only three
were used in t he s timulus sets p resen ted to a particular
SUbject. Those used possessed at least one of t he c ue
values that d e fi ne d t he covariation (e .g . , one that is
curved a nd small, one that i s large and straight, and one
that is both curved and l arge - the covariationl. The
f eatures which def ined the covariation wer e counte r -balanced
over pa rticipants. Thus , for 25% of the participa nts i n
'Analyses conducted on bo!lIerrors tocriterion and trialsto criterionyielded 5imil ~r results.
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each ce l l, the covariaeion was smal l and stra ight, for 25t
t he cova r i a t i on was small and curved , for 25 t the
co variation was large and s t r a i g h t , a nd for t he remaining
25' t he covariation wa s large and curved.
During training, both g roups of participants were
exposed to a v a ri e t y o f tra ini ng sets in which the
co var-Lac I cn rule was represented. This was a c complished by
using three-sided figures during t r a i ni ng whi ch were varied
r andoml y between t r i a l s i n terms of l en g t h of sides , whether
the curved s i de was convex o r co nc ave, and defining angle o f
the isosceles t riangle {30, 60, 90 , 120 deqz-ees L.
Partic ipants in the one irre l evant dimension condi t ion
experienced the stimulus sets described above . Wit hin
t r i a l s , t h e stimuli differed i n size (large or small) , shape
(cu rved or straigh t ) , and po si tion on the co mpu t e r s c r e e n
(lef t , middle o r r ight ) . Size and shape were t he r e aeve n t
d ime ns ions de t e rmi n i ng the covariation, while pos i tion was
an irre levant d i mens i on . For the two irrelevant dimensions
participants , the st imulus d i men ef on e (size, s hape, and
pos ition) als ~" va r i e d within trials . I n addition, the two
i r r e l e va nt d i me ns i on groups were exposed t o another
irrelevant d i mension , sti mulus pattern, which v a r i ed within
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trials (see Figure Ib). Thus , these par t i cipants
experienced two irrelevant dimensions - po s ition of the
stimul us on the screen and stimulus pattern . Stimulus
pa t t e rn refers to the way in which the inside of the shape
was pa tterned . The cue values used to represent the pa t tern
d.imension were sol id-tilled (the s t i mul us shape was coloured
in comple tely) , stripes (t he stimulus s hape had stripes
running through i t ) , a nd unfilled (the s t i mul us sh ape was
l e f t unpat t e r ne d l .
Tx:a.D.af..e.r: . The covariation between shape an d si ze was
mai ntained on the tran~fer task . Howeve r, i nstead of the
t hree-sided figures used in t ra ining, rcur - s ided figu res
were used (s ee Figure 2 ) . The participants we r e expos ed t o
four s timulus s e t s , which consisted of e ither three squ ares,
thr e e paral lelograms , three rhomb us e s, o r t h r e e irregular
quadrilaterals . Each of the sets was presented six times
during t r a ns f er generating a t ot a l of 24 trans f e r t r i a ls .
On eight randomly de termined t rials the i rrelevant dimens ion
ot position was present; on anothe r e ight randomly
determined trials the irreleva n t dimension of position a nd
the i r relevant pattern dimens ion was present ; and on the
fina l eight r a nd oml y determined trials the i r relevant
45
dimension of position, the irrelevant pattern dimension, and
an additional third irrelevant dimension was present . This
third irrelevant dimension involved the number of lines
(one, two, or three ) projecting from the top of the stimuli .
As in training, length of sides, whether the curved side was
convex or concave, and the position of the correct stimulus
was randomized for each subject.
The participants wer e tested in their schools. The
stimuli were presented via computer. A button box, with
three buttons representing the three stimuli on the screen ,
was used for the participants to indicate their choices .
During training, the children were told : "Each time you will
see three things on the computer screen . One of them will
always be correct. If you choose the correct thing you will
see a "check" over yo ur choice . If you choose the wrong
thing you will see an "Yo" over your choice ." The
appropriate word, either "correct" or "incorrect" also
appeared at the bottom of the screen. No additional
feedback was given . The training criterion was nine correct
responses in any successive ten trials.
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Inmediately after reach i ng criterion , the transfer t e s t
was presented . The children were tol d : "Now y ou will see
some new thi ngs on t he computer screen . It you thi nk abo ut
what you j ust l e a rn ed , the n y ou will be able to choose t he
co r r e c t th ing each time . This t ime though, t h e compute r
will not tel l y ou whether you are r ight o r wr ong . "
After complet ing the t ransfer task , the children wer e
given a ve rbal awareness t est , designed around a four ·point
s cori ng sys tem (s e e Appen dix A.l . Child ren were f irst asked :
"How did you solve the probl em?" If t h ey cor rer.~ ly
i dentif i ed t he covariation (e. g . , "It was a lways the l a rg e
cu rve d one . " ) . t hey were scored a t hree and quest ioning
c e a s e d . If t he y c orrectly identified only on e me mbe r o f the
co variati on , (e . g . • "Ye s . The large cne s s l , they we r e a sked ,
"How do you know this? The re were two l arg e one s . "
Following this ques tion. if they co r r e c t l y i d e nt i fi e d t he
second dimension they wer e scored a two , otherwise t h e y
received a one .
Children who incorrec tly answe red the first q ue s t i on
( i . e. "How d i d you solve t he p ro blem?" ) were sco r e d zero ,
while children who failed t o give a ny a ns wer t o t hi s
question were p r ompt e d by the quest ion "Di d yo u not i ce that
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any parti cula r ~ of ob ject was correc t ? " If t he y t hen
co r rec t ly identif ied t he covariat i on t hey were s co red a
three . If they co r r ectly de fin ed only one member of the
cov a ria t ion , t he y were a s ked "How do y ou know t his; ther e
wer e two ld ime ns ions)? " . If t h ey correct l y answered that
question, t hey were scored a t wo , otherwise they were s cored
a one . Partic ipa n t s who ga ve a wro ng a nswer t o t.he prompt.ed
question, or failed t o answer t.he question a t. a ll were
scored zero .
Resul ts
The ma in focus of this stud y was t o see how individual
diff erences in awa r e ne s s affect c ovari a tion l earning an d
t rans fer . preliminary a na lyse s were conducted in o rder to
determine which variables coul d be el i mi nated f rom
su bs equ en t analyses . I t wa s expect ed t ha t there would be an
un equ a l distribut i on of pa r ticipants ' awaren e ss scores
a c r oss grade , and the number of i r r ele va nt d imensions d uring
t r ai n i ng. Preliminary a nal y s es a re d e s cribed firs t , i n
order t o j us t ify the eliminat ion of the bet we en - sub j ects
va ri able gender and justify the r ea s on i ng behind t he
r e s ca ling of the verba l awareness mea su re for subsequent
analyses . Further r efe rences to preliminary analyses will
.8
be included on ly if it adds t o the findings from subsequent
analyses. A Chi Square analysis performed on the number of
part icipants obtaining each of the rescaled awareness scores
is then described . This is followed by a description of the
unweightl?d means analyses which were designed to explore the
effects of verbal awareness. All participants included in
the analyses reached criterion, r e f l e c t i ng that children are
capable of learning covariations either implicitly or
explicitly.
pre) iminary Analyses
I n i t i a l analyses of variance were performed on the
dependent variables verbal awareness, criterion latency
(average time, in seconds, of latencies on the last nine
trials of the criterion run), errors to criterion (the
number of errors made during training), transfer latency
(average time, in seconds, of l a t enc i e s over each of one ,
two, and three irrelevant test ddmenedcne) , and number of
correct responses made during transfer (total number of
correct responses for eight sets each of one, two, and three
i r r e l ev a nt test dimensions). The independent variables in
these analyses were g rade j fou r versus five) , gender (male
versus female), the number of irrelevant training dimensions
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one versus two) , an d, where appropriate, the number of
ir re levant test d imensions (one versus two ve rsus three).
In no analysis was a c on t rast effect involving gender
signi ficant. The refore, ge nde r was not included as an
independent variable in subsequent analyses of variance .
Ve rhal awareness Upon complet ion of the transfer
t a s k , pa r tic i pan t s were asked the question "How di d you
solve the problem?" . Par t i c i pa nt s who could not provide an
answe r to t h i s ques tion were assigned an awareness score of
zero I those who could provide only one dimension of the
covariation were scored one; t hose who could initial ly
provide on ly one dimension, but were able to supply t he
second when prompted were scored twc r and finally, those who
responded initially with both dimensions of the covariaticn
were scored three . This procedure resul ted in a four -point
a wareness scale rang ing from unawa r e (zero) to aware
(three) .
As was expected (see Table 1) , an unequal distribut ion
o f awareness scores was a pparent a c r os s grade and nu mbe r of
i rre levant training dimens i ons . There were on ly t wo g rade
f i v e partici pa nts tra ined on one i r relevant dimension , and
one g r ade five pa rticipant t rained on tw o irrelevant
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d imensions who had awareness scores of ze r o . Moreover,
there were very f ew fif th grade part icipants t rained on one
irrelevant dimension who had a n awareness score of one (s ee
Table 1) . Because of the pa uci t y o f pa r tic ipants in the
cells representing grade five participants t r a ined on one
i r r e l evan t dimension who had awareness scores o f zero and
one, and grade f i ve participants trained on two irrelevant
dimensions who had an awareness score of zero , the awareness
scoring system was rescaled . part icipants who could not
provide any dimension o f the covariation (that is , scored
zero on awareness ) were combined wi th those who could sl.:pply
one dimension of the covariation (that is, scored one on
awareness); this group was given a score of one in
subsequent enatyees" . The r e s ca ling resulted i n three
classifications of awareness ; verbally u naware (one ,
implicit l ea r ne r s ), partially aware (two) , an d verbally
' llnillybearguedthatlheparti~pantsinciudedintherescaledllwarene5ll Ievelonell~Ilclollllyparlillilellrner~,
IIlI lheyacquired onedimensionorl1\eeoeoaucn. However. in llIeeontext of the task ernpl" yed, knowledge uf only mu:
dimensionwould not have beenenough ror partieipanlS10solve the problem ~cce.'>IifOlly. It wa~ Ilssumed thaI "IJcce~~rlll
trainingpermrmaeceorthi~ combinedgruupcould not have teen due to C<Jl~'<CilJU~ krlUWledSl: or ju.'Il. OIlC dimcn., inn 1110111>.
IrvJeed, prcliminary analY5es indi<:aled no difference belWeenthe zern and OlleaW<lrene5llIevelgrollps. OnlheerroNilu
criterion mea.'IIJ~, participanlSwho had an awarenes.' .core of zero averaged IS.(» errors (lItaoollrderror "r lhe lIl1'lln-
3.67) and partieipan15 who had an awarene~s score of Olleaveraged 16,92 errors (AtIlndard error of uie rncan"2.1l7"
Similarly, uiere were no differences between !heR twO grOllp~ on Il'l<OlIfer, Partidpa lllSwholhad an awareneK~ """ re "r
zeroaV(!raged 4.68 correct TeSp(II\'lCSon ll'an,<;fer (SIalldar4error of jhe mean... 62) and partid panU wh" had an awa rcnc~~
sco re of one averaged 4.81 correct re~rllnses on IraOllrer (~\.3 l1(\ard error oflhe mean.. .46). Because the training lind
lfa!ll;rer performanceof levels aero aod one awareness did not differ, it WllI; presumed thaI huth gruupKwere employing
the same jmplicjtles ming precesses.
51
aware (t hr e e , exp licit learner s ) .
Number Of Parti c ipants Cat£garized at Each Level o f
Awareness a s a FUDction Of Number Of Irrelevant Tra j n jng
A x' test of independence was conducted t o test the
p r ed i ction that the percentage of pa rtic ipants learning
implici tly would increase as a function of the number of
irrelevant dimens i on s. Consistent with prediction , t hi s
i ncre a s e was obtained, xa (1 } .. 4 .48, ~ < .05 . The number of
participant s classified as implicit learners increased from
13 (2 7\ ) on one irrelevant dimension to 23 (48%:) on two
irrelevant dimensions supporting the proposition of Seger
(1994 ) t ha t the implicit system c a n deal better with
increases i n i rrelevant i n f orma tion than the exp l ici t
system. Conv e rsely , the number o f explicit learners dropped
from 23 (48\) on one irrelevant dim ension t o 17 (3 5\ ) on two
i r r e l eva nt dimensions . Similarly , the number o f pa rtial
learners d ropped from 12 (25\) on one irrelevant dimens ion
to 8 (17\) on two irrelevant dimensions .
HnwPj ghted Means Analyses
Er rors t o rrj terioD The interaction be tween the
number of i r relevant t raining dimens ions and awa reness, .£ (2,
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84) = 4 . 62, ~ < . 0 5 , was h i gher order t o the main effect of
numbe r of irreleva nt t ra ining dimensions, £(2, B4) .. 15 . 2 5 ,
~ < . 001. I t was predic t ed t hat lea r ning woul d be slower a s
the numbe r of irrelevant d i mens i ons increased. As this was
the case f o r participants a t al l levels of aware n e s s , the
main effect of numbe r o f Lr -rerevanc training dimensions is
interpretable (see Table 2). However, even though this
di f f e r en c e was s ignificant for implicit, Sa (2 , 60) = 6 .44 ,
J;l < . 05, and explicit learners, 502 (2 , 6 0) = 28 .07 , 11 <
.001 , the difference was not significant for partial
learners , 53 (2, 60) ... 01, 11 > . 1 0 .
The p r ed i c t i on t hat expl i ci t learners would be more
affected by the added irrelevant dimensions than implicit
learners was partially supported (se e Tab l e 2) . Explicit
learners made fewer errors t ha n t he average of implicit a nd
partial learners when t r a i ne d wi t h on e i r r elevan t training
dimen s i on , ,5.3 (2, 60) = 1 8 . 6 7, 11 < . 001 , an d made more
e rrors than t he average of impl i c i t a nd partia l l e a r ne r s
when trained with two irrelevant t raining d imensions , .s.3 (2,
60 ) = 3.60, R < . 10 . Al t hough t he differe nc e between
ex plici t l e ar n e r s a nd the mean of i mp lic i t and partial
learners trained on t wo irrelevant d imensions was not
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significant , the dif f e r e nce between exp licit and pa r t i a l
learners was s ignificant , s.~ (2 , 60 ) = 7.75 , ~ < . 05.
Cri t erion la t e ncy No s igni f i cant con trast effects
were obtai ned in the unweighted means analysis of va r i ance
performed on the criterion l a t en cy measure . The weighted
means analysis of va r i a nc e , however , was a little more
sensi tive showing an e ffec t fo r grade , .E (1 , S8) = 4.08 , ~ <
. 05. Older ch ildren (grade five ) responded faster during
training than younger ch ildren (g r a de four), with respective
cri t e rion l at ency means o f 2.99 and 3 .66 se c onds.
Tran sfer latency The analyses performed on the
trans fe r l a t e ncy data yielded no signi ficant contras t
ef f ects. Clear ly, the time it took participants t o respond
during training and t ransfer was litt le affected by t he
number of irrelevan t t raining dimens i ons, gender, or level
of awareness , wh ile g r ade had only a minor effect .
Number o f correct responses po t r a n s f e r The
interaction between awareness level and the number of
i rrelevant trai ning dimensions , .E (2, 84) = 3.62, X) < .05,
was higher order to the mai n e f fects of awareness level , .E
(2 , 84) = 14. 98, P < . 001 , a nd the number o f i rreleva nt
t r a i n i ng dimen s i ons .E (1, 84) '" 5 . 15 , X). < . 05 . Whe n
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trdining involved one irrelevant dimension explicit learners
made more correct responses on transfer than did the average
o f the implicit and partial learners, So' (2, 60 ) .. 6.52 , i:I e
. 05 (see Table 3 ). When two irrelevant dimensions were used
i n training, imp l icit learners made fewer co r r ec t responses
on t r a ns fe r than did the average of the partial and explicit
learners Sl (2, 60) = 8 .66, ;g. < . 05. Note , however , the
main effect of number of irrelevant training dimensions is
interpretable as the number of correct responses made on
transfer i ncreased as a function of the number o f i r r e l evant
dimensions during training for al l levels of awareness (see
Table 3). This finding suggests that t he presence of
increased irrelevant dimensions during t r a i ning facil i tates
t r a ns f e r under a variety of conditions .
Interestingly , grade fo ur part icipants made more
correct responses on transfer when trained with one
irr elevant d imension, than did grade five participants with
mean correct responses of 5 .85 and 5 .22, respectively . The
oppos i te pattern was obtained when training involved two
irreleva nt d imensions. Grade five pa r t i cipa n t s made more
correct responses on transfer when trained with two
irrelevant dimensions than grade four participants with mean
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co r rect r e s pons e s of 6 .71 an d 5 .93 , respectively . This
cross -over pattern produced a s ignificant grade by
irreleva nt tra ining dimens ions i n t e r a c tion, .f (1 , 84 )
4 .13, 12 e . 05. Al t hough an expl anation f o r this effect is
not readi ly apparent., it could have something to d o wi th
experience in co mplex problem solving domai ns .
Finally, the grade by test interaction, f (2, 168 } =
3 .08 , I;l e . 05 , was h i gher orde r 1:0 the main effect of t e s t ,
.f (2, 168 ) .. 7. 34 , I;l e . 0 01. I n both grades performance was
worse when 3 irrelevant d i me ns i ons appeared on test trials
(s e e Table 4 ) . Grade f our participants performed better on
t r a ns f e r sets with one irrelevant test d imension t han on the
av erage of two and three irre levant test dimensions, £ 2 (2 ,
60 ) = 17. 37, g e .001. Grade five pa rt icipants , on t he
other ha nd, performed better on t r a ns f e r ove r t h e average of
one and t wo irrelevant t e s t dimensions than on t h ree
i r r e l eva n t test d imens ions I however, this difference wa s not
signif icant , £2 (2, 60) = 6 .18, P < .1 0. It wou ld s e em t h a t
as c hild ren get o lder t h e y get bet t er at ha ndling
i nc reasingly complex .i.. .celevant i n f o rmation .
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Discussion
The predictions made in the present s tudy we r e , f or t he
most part , supported . As t he number of i r re levant
dime ns ions incr e a s ed , the pe rcentage of child ren learning
impl icitly also increased . In a dd it ion, the number of
i r re levant training dimens ions did i nde ed slow down
learning . Al t hough this tren d was appa rent at all levels of
awareness, the e f f e c t was pa r ti cu l arly large for t he
expl i cit l earne r s . Trabasso a nd Bower (1 968 ) s tate that
ove r -training ca n faci litate explicit knowl edge of t he r ule s
governing a t r a ini ng task . Because an increase in the
numbe r of irrelevant dime nsions r e s ul t ed in t he explicit
l ea r ne r s be ing exposed to more trial s before reaching
cri terion, it might be a rgued t ha t thi s pa rticular group may
have acquired explicit knowledge t h r ough over-training .
This argument can be r eadily d iscounted howeve r, as explicit
l ea r ne r s t r a i ned on one irrelevant d i me ns i on we r e exposed to
the feweat t ra i ning t rials of all g roups . Still, t hey
acqui red explicit knowl edg e of t he covaria tion ru le.
participants at al l levels of verbal awareness , not
just exp l icit l ea r ners, we re able to t ransfer t o some
extent. However, t he be s t t r a ns f er pe r formance was a ppa rent
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i n explicit l ea r n e r s when t raining i nvolved one irrelevan t
d imension , a nd in partial and explicit learners when
t r a i n i ng involved two irrelevant dimensions.
Mu ch of the implic i t l earning literature t o date ha s
bee n a t he ore t i cal . Mos t i mplicit researchers (Reber , 1967 ..
1976 ; Rebe r & Lewis. 1977; Lewicki, 1986 .. Lewick::. e t a l .
1987; 1988) have drawn co nc lusions regarding whether
i mplicit learning can occur, while reviewers of exis ting
i mplicit studies (Seger, 1994 ; Shanks & St .John;1994) have
dealt primari ly with methodological flaws and criticisms.
However, ne i ther the researchers no r the r eviewers have
attempted to present a mode l wh ich illust rates the processes
thr ou gh which i mplicit a nd ex plicit learning oc cur. In t he
fol lowing d iscussion, a working model of the way in which
both i mplicit a nd explicit processes may funct ion in the
l e arning p r ocess wi l l be offered an d emphasized i n an
a ttempt t o i ntegr a t e t he exis t ing literature with the
r esults of the pre s ent study . The p :r:i ncipl e a s s umption is
t hat learning i s not e i t he r i mplicit o r e~plici t, bu t both,
wi th the ob s erved process being that which a cquires t he
relevan t i nformat i on more quickly.
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Me t hodg l ogi ca l I s sues
Much of the criticism s urrounding the implici t learning
studies , such as t h o se undertaken by Reber (196 7, 19 71 1 and
Lewicki ee at . 119 8 7, 1988 ), has centred ar o und
methodological i ssues . Specifical l y. Sh anks and St . J ohn
( 19 94) c laim previ o u s research to be in vio l a t io n of t he
Information and s e n s i tiv i t y Criteria . Reca l l that the
Informat ion Crite r ion re qu i res t hat t he awareness t es t
asses s the informa tion r espons i b le for per f ormance change .
In the present s t udy. an a t t empt to me e t the Info rmat ion
Criterion was made b y usi ng child participants an d a s i mp le
task fo r which t here were only a few possib le solu tions . The
more diffic u l t tasks r equ dr ed f o r adult popUlat ions lend
t he mse lves t o alternc.t ive solutions that the experimente r
may not seek o r find i n verbal awareness. Whe n difficult
tasks a r e used and pa rticipants cannot ve rbalize the ru l e
that t he ex perimenter expects t hem to employ. the c onclus i on
may be implicit l e a rn i ng when conscious l earni ng a c tually
occurr e d . With c hild pa r ticipa nts and a simple t a s k, i t i s
more likely that the i nf o rmat i o n sought i n the verbal
awar en e ss t est is i ndee d the i nforma t ion r espon s i b l e f o r
performance c hange .
ss
An a t tempt was also made t o mee t t he Sensi tivi ty
Crite rion . Acco r ding t o Shanks and St . J ohn (1994), t h e
Sensi tivity Criterion r e qu ires t ha t the awareness t est be
able t o pick up a ll rele va nt conscious i nformation possessed
by t he partici pant . I n the awa r en e s s test employed in t he
present study part icipants we re e ncouraged to d r aw on a l l
r e leva n t co nscious inf orma tion they may h av e ac qui re d during
t rain ing . I n addi tion , the t ransfer task , which use d the
same methodology as training, wa s p resumed to s upp l eme n t t he
ewereneee t es t with an additional measure of performance .
The t r a ns fe r task was de s igned t o de termine whethe r the
informa tion acqui red duri ng t r a i n i ng cou ld be t rans fe r r ed to
a nov e l t a s k , an d whether su ccessful t ransfer was a f unction
of ve r bal awa r e ness . The awar ene s s test cou l d on ly provide
a ve r ba l a c count of acquired kn owledge, while t h e t r ansfer
t ask allowed t hi s knowledge to be mea su red a s a f un c tion of
pe r formance , in a con text similar to t hat of tra i ning.
Ac QUi s i ti o n Of Cp y ari ati p n I n f p rm a t i p D
Little research ha s been conducted investigating how
children acqu i r e covariation i n f o rma t i on . Kuhn et a t .
(1 988 ), Sod i a n (1 994) an d Ruffman e t al. (19 93 ) have s hown
t hat children are ca pab l e of understa nding co varia t ion s when
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they are explicit.ly di rected t o them . They di d not ,
howeve r , address t h e questions of whe ther children ca n l earn
cov a ria t i on s without specific direction, or whe t her they can
l earn covariations impl. i citly or explicitl. y . Th e se were t he
questions the present s tudy wa s designed t o answer, with
spe c i a l attention paid t o level of aw areness and the
presence or ab sence of irre l evant dimensions .
Impli ci t Versus exp l i c it l earn ing All children
i nc luded in the a nalyses in t he present s t u dy reached
criterion d uring t r ai ning . d emonstrating t hat fourth and
fi f t h grade childr en can learn covariat ion s ei t h er
implic it l y or expl i citly without sp e ciU c direction t o the
cova riation . This fin d i ng supports the conjecture of
Lewicki et a l. 11 9 94.) who propose d t hat c hildr e n can l ea rn
complex c on tingencies implicitly . However, it s hould be
note d t hat not a l l of t he ch i l dre n i ni tially employed in
t his study reached cri t erion. Of t h e grade fo ur
part i cipants , fou r we r e rep laced i n the one i r r e l eva n t
t r a ining dimens i on cond ition a nd nine were r '!!pl a ced i n the
t wo irre levant traini ng dimensions c ondition, whereas o f t he
grad e fiv e pa r t i cipants . one was rep laced i n the one
i r r e l evant tra in i ng dimens ion condition and thr ee we re
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rep l a c ed in the t wo irrelevant t ra i n i ng dime nsions
condi tion . Therefore childr en's ability to ac quir e
i nf o rma tion implicitly would appear to be influenced by
their grade level a s well as the relative difficul ty of the
task.
Under what conditions is implicit learning likely to be
activa ted over ex plici t l earn i n g? From the point of view of
Sege r (1994), imp l icit l e arn ing reflec ts the acquis ition o f
i nf o rmation t hat i s t oo sophist icated to be handled
eff i c i ently by the consc i ous . Thi s p o s i t i on is also held by
Lewick i e t a l. (1992) an d Reber (19 89) . Recall the propo s a l
t ha t t he i mplicit sy stem uses pa r allel processing in
acquiring information via associations whereas the exp licit
system engages in conscious hypothesis testing t hrough
serial pro c e s sing . Bas e d on t h i s presumption , the implicit
system would become more e ff i c i ent t ha n the explici t system
whe n dea l ing wit h increas ingly complex i n f orma t i on because
t he explici t sys tem wou l d inco rporate the ex tra i nformation
i nto t esta b le hypoth es e s , incr e asi ng the amoun t of
processing a s a power function of additional dimensions,
t hereby, decr easing t he r a t e of l earning .
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In the present study. adding an irrelevant dim ension
during training -....as the means by which the complexity of the
learning task was increased . The additional i rrelevant
i n f orma t i on was presumed to result in an increase in the
number of testable hypotheses fo r the conscious system to
process, subsequently dec reasing its efficiency i n reaching
a solution. The unconscious system. on the o ther hand. may
rely more on associations than hypothesis testing and
therefore may be less affected by extra information. For
both pathways . however . learning would be expected to s low
down as the extra irrelevant information wou l d make for more
associations t o select from (imp licit learning) as well as
extra testable hypotheses (explicit learning). Learning was
s lowe r on two irrelevant dimensions than one irrelevant
dimension for all levels of a....areness , and. as expected,
t h i s was particularly true f or the explici t learners.
Bxplici t l ea r ners made the fewest errors when t r a i n i ng
involved one i rrel ev a nt dimension and the mos t e rrors when
training i nvo lved two i r relevant dimensions . This finding
supports the contention that t he uncons c i ous can d e a l wi t h
some types of relat ively c omplex information, at l eaat in
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the learning p hase , with more efficiency than the conscious
(Lewicki et al ., 19 9 2 ; Reber , 1989; Seger, 19 94 ) .
Similarly, it was predicted that t h e pe rcentage of
children lear ning implicitly would increase as a function of
the number of irrelevar:t dimensions. Since extra
in formation increases t he number of possible hypot heses to
be tested (Gholson , 1980 ) , the learning rate for the
expl icit system would slow down as a consequence of the
serial processing o f additiona l hypotheses. On the other
hand, if t he i mplic i t system engages in parallel processing,
it would be Less affected than the explicit system as the
difficulty of the task increases. Consistent with this
prediction, i t was the case that the n umber of participants
l ear n ing implicitly increased while the number of
participants learn ing ex plicitly decreased when the number
of i rre levant trai ning d imens ions increased from one to two.
A possibl e explanat ion for this s hift in learning
pathways an d l ear n i ng r ate s is based on the h ypot he s i s that
all i ndividu a l s have the capacity to l e a r n b o t h i mpl i ci t l y
and explicitly. That is, both implicit and explici t
processes operate s imultaneously, resu lting in a race to
de termine which wil l so lve the problem fi rst . This
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hypothesis i s dev e l oped by borrowing some ideas from
Mille r ' s (19 48) confl ict. t heory . Miller (1948) p roposed
that r esponse strength t o a g oa l (e i t her positive or
neg a tive ) was a function of d i s t anc e , with the a v o i da n c e
grad i ent fall ing o ft mor e s teepl y than the app roach g r ad ient
a s distance increased . Simi larly , i t implicit and explicit
processes fo r an i ndividu al were plo e t ed on a gr a ph where
t he x - axi s r epr e s e nt ed e ask difficulty an d t he y-axis
r epresented l earning r a t e, t he exp licit g rad ien t would fall
off more qu ickly than t h e implicit g r ad i ent . Th i s
assumpt ion is consistent wi t h the d a t a in the pre se nt study ;
although the learning rate d e cr ea s e d for al l levels o f
awa reness when t raini ng i nvo lved tw o i rrelevant dimensions ,
t he decrease was ecee d rama t i c fo r t he e xp lici t learners .
Miller (19 48) also proposed an i nt e rsectio n of the
approach and ev otdence grad i ents . 'rne point o f ineersect ion
between the two g r ad i e nts is t he di s t ance from t he go a l
where app roach a nd avo i dance are equally l i kely a nd would
yiel d vacillation betwe en t h e t wo r e sp ons e s , r e sul ting i n
vica rious trial a nd error behaviour. Similarly. as both the
imp licit a nd explici t gradients dr o p of f, ther e i s a po i nt
at which t he t wo will interse ct . This intercep t i s d e fi ned
65
in t he present s tudy as the task: d i f ficulty i nt e r cept , the
tas k difficulty l eve l at which i mplici t and explicit
learning are eacumed to occ u r at the same rate. The task
difficul ty l evel at t he point of i n t er s e c t i on will vary
betwee n i ndividuals. An i nd i vi dua l who usual ly l ea r ns
implicitly has an intercept at a low leve l of task
diff i cUlty and learns mor e d iffi cu lt problems imp licitly
(s e e Figure Ja ) . The average l ea r ne r ha s an intercept at a
mode r at e level of t a s k di ff iculty with explicit processing
dominat ing ea s y tasks , and implicit pr ocess ing dominating
diffi cult t a s ks (s ee F igure 3b) . Fi nally, t he individua l
who usually learns explici t ly has a n i ntercep t at a high
l e vel of task difficu lty wi t h explicit processing dominating
on easier p r oble ms (s e e Fi g u r e 3c l . If we were to p lot the
proportion of i nd i vidu a l s having intercept points at a
particular level of task d i fficu l ty on a graph wi th the y -
ax is representing the proport i on of individuals and t he x -
axis r epre s ent ing tas k di f fiCUl ty , we would expect t o find
low propo r t ions o f i ndivi du als who have int er cept s on e i ther
eas y tasks or d iff i cult ta sks . The large s t proportion of
i ndiv i dua l s would have a task: di f fi cul t y intercept at
mode r ate t a sk diff iculty level8 .~ i ;:t.... Fi gu re 4 ) . As a work ing
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hypothe sis , we assume this d istribution t o be normal.
"S mart " Me nt a' prQcesses
In the present s tudy , most four th and fi f th grade
children learned covariations either implicit ly or
explicitly. The next step is to determi ne whether or no t
either of these mental p rocesses are "smart" . Lof tus and
Klinger (199 2 ) define a smart mental proce ss as one t hat can
su ccessfully analyze complex patterns a nd one t h a t can deal
fl exibly with nov el situations . I n the present study , it
was f oun d that both consc ious and unconsc ious processes can
analyze sophist icated i nfo rmat i on, although the e xplicit
system slows down more qu ickly than the i mpl i c i t s y s t em when
tw o irr eleva n t dimensions a re present. None t he less, bot h
implicit and explicit l e a r ner s a cqu ired the covariation rule
with two irrelevant d imensions (that is , t he more c ompl e x
st imul us eeue ) . However, wi t h respect t o dealing flexibly
wi th nov e l s ituations , the i mpl i c i t system appeared t o be
less smart than the explicit system. A.lthough implicit
learners were ab le to t r an sfer, explicit learners made more
co r r e c t trans fe r responses than implici t learners,
regardless of training condition.
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This fi ndi ng contrasts with that of Rabinowitz and Howe
(1994), who f ound that only t he participants who could
verbalize the middle ru le (t ha t is, explicit learners) wer e
successful at transferring the knowledge of that rule to
nove l stimuli . Note that the transfer tasks employed by
Rabi nowitz and Howe (1994) and that used in the present
study differed. I n the p r es e nt study, the transfer task
involved on ly a mi nor contextual ch ange to the physical
dimension of the stimul i . part icipants were r equ i r ed to
transfer knowledge acqu i red during t r a i ni n g with three-sided
figures to stimul us sets wit h f our - s i ded figures.
Therefore, with t h e ex ception of this minor change in
stimuli, t he context o f t he training task and the transfer
task were s i mila r . Thi s was n o t the case wi th Rabinowitz and
Howe (l994 ). Recall t hat par t icipants we r e required to
r esp o nd wi t.h the co nce p t ual mi ddl e (e .g . the mi d dle number
of dots ) and not the pos itional middle . In t he ir transfer
t a sk, the d i mens i o ns represen t ed in the s t i mul u s sets were
comp letely diff e r e nt t han those us e d i n t raining, thereby
eliminating any c ont extua l similar ity between t rainin g and
transfer s timulus sets .
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The contextual d ifferences be tween t he present s tudy
and that of Rabinow it z and Howe (1994 ) suggests an
i nteresting pos s ib il i t y r egarding the i mplic i t pathway .
Because Rabinowit z and Howe (1 994 ) t ot a lly cha n ged t h e
physical co nt ext on transfer . the c ontextu al cues upon which
i mplicit learners might r el y were eliminated . Pres u min g
t hat implicit learners rely o n associative l e a rning , t he
context in which learning oc curred would be f undamental t o
successful transfer ( t ha t i s , s timul us g eneralization) . If
t his were t he c a se, implicit learners would no t be able to
t r a n s fer information acquired i n the learni ng phase to
s t imuli that lacked cont extual sup port . The p hysi c a l
con t e xt i n t he present s tu d y was on ly mi nimally cha n ged o n
transfer . Even so , on the transfer task, imp l icit learne r s
performed more poorly than explici t l ea r ner s when t r ained on
one i rrelevant dimens ion , and more poorly t ha n partial and
expl icit learners comb ined when tra ined on t wo irrelevant
dimens ions . Should implici t learners re ly on contextual cues
during associative lear ning t o acquire training i nf o rmat i on,
then even a minor cha nge to transfer st imuli will prove
det rimental to performa nce b ecau s e the gene r a l iz at i o n of the
associations used in learning "'ould be impeded. The refore ,
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it would seem t hat maintenan ce o f cont extual cues is
necessar y for s u cces sful t ransfe r per formance i n imp l i ci t
learners. It appears that i n the abse nce of context ual
co ngrui t y , the i mplic i t system is not smart. In fact . a task
that mai ntains contextual c ues usually is not n ovel. Such a
co nclus i o n supports Greenwald' s ( 19 92) contention t h at t h e
unconscious is not particularly sophisticated as it can only
t ransf.er acquired information t o situa tions t hat are s imilar
t o those experienced i n tra i n ing .
Pa rt ial I ,e a rners
The resul ts obta ined from t he partial learners merit
ad ditional theoretical spe c ulation, This group of
pa:t."tic:ipants provide d one dimens i on of the covadat ion when
initial ly queried on the verbal awareness t e s t , but wer e
ab le t o provide t he second when f ur t he r prompted . Du r ing
t raining , partial l e a r ners. i n comparison t o the i mplicit
and explicit l e arner s , were affected minimally by t he added
i r r elev a n t dimension of st i mul us pattern. Dur i ng t ransfer.
part ial l earners pe r formed a t t he le vel of imp lici t l earne r s
when training invo lved one i r re l e vant d i mens i o n , but at the
level o f expl icit l e a r ner s when t r ai ni ng Lnvc.Lved two
i r relevant di mensions .
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Reca l l t h e assu mptions that: imp l i cit a nd ex p l icit
lear ning p rocesses are act ivated upon commenc ing a l e ar ni n g
task; al l i nd i vidua ls learn faster exp licitly than
i mp licitly on v ery easy tasks; t he explicit gradient fall s
off more q ui ckly than t he i mplicit gradient: a point of
intersection will occur where bo th implicit and ex p licit
learning are occurri ng ac the same ra te (se e Figure 3); and
this poi n t wi l l vary be tween i nd ividua ls. I t is also
assumed that partial learners acqu i r e i nform a t i on at
approximately the same ra te implicitly and e xplic i t l y (that
is, eac h of t he partial l e a r ners is at the point of
i n t e r se c tion l . Thus , the p artial learners s hould be able to
a c cess either i mplicit (associations ) or ex plicit
i nformat ion (h ypotheses ) o n the trans f er test . In the
present s t udy, part ial l earner s t rained on one irrelevant
d i mension (easy task) pe rfo rmed l i ke implicit l ea rne r s
during transfer , whe reas t h e partial l ear ne r s trai ned on two
irrel evant d imensions (di f ficul t task) performed l i ke
e x plici t lea r ners.
A final a ssump tion, that learne r s have a preference for
a c cess i n g eit her i mp licit o r explicit i nformation in
t r a ns fe r situ a tions whic h i s base d on how they us u ally solve
71
problems of the same type, can explain the transfer
performance . When an i ndivi dua l is a partial learner on one
Lrxej.evant; dimens ion thei r i t'l',pl i cit and explici t lear ning
cur veu a re p resumed to resemble enc ee o f indi v iduals who
us u a l l y l earn i mplicitly , t h e r e f or e they would solve most
prob lems of this type imp licitly and on t ransf e r would have
a pref e r en ce for acces sing implicit i nformation. Similarly ,
when an i nd ivi dua l is a partial l e a r ne r on t wo i r r elevan t
dimensions their implicit and expJ i c it l e a r ning curves are
presumed to resemble those of individuals who us ua lly learn
exp l ic i t l y. Therefore , they solve most problems o f t hi s
t ype exp l i c itl y , and sh ow a prefe rence for accessing
explicit information on transfer . I n Figure 5 , a possible
assumpt i on ab out the t ask difficulty i ntercept point and the
preference f or a c cess ing either expl i c it or i mpl icit
informa t i on i s presented . When the intercept i s at high
levels o f task complexity, an i ndividual will prefer to
access expl i cit i n fo rma t i on. Alternatively, when t h e
intercept is at l ow levels of task complexity , an d
individual will prefer to access i mplicit i nformation .
The o nl y f inding t hat cannot be readily e xp l ain ed is
the training performance of partial l e a r n er s on two
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irre levant dimensions . Re ca ll that pa rtial learne rs trained
on two i rre l ev a nt dimensions lea r ned at a f aster rate t han
did the explicit lea rne rs . It i s un clear why t h i s pa rtial
group s olved t he diff i cult problem s o r ap idly . Thi s find i ng
may be an a nomaly, as the number of pa rticipan ts i n t his
group was sma ll (e i gh t ). It would be ne c e s sary to
replicate t he experiment to de t.ermi. ne if the finding i s
repre s en t at i v e .
with respect t o t he tra ns fer pe r formance of the part i al
l e a r n e r s , advocates of an uns oph i s tica t ed unconscious may
pose another explanation t o account f o r t he partia l l earners
transfe't' ring l i ke i mplicit learners when t r a i ned on one
i rre l ev an t d imension and like explic i t learne r s when t r a l ne d
on t wo i r r e l ev a nt d imensions . I t may be a r gued that the
participants ac qu ired fragmentary conscious knowledge o f t he
unde r lyi ng rule t hat was no t un cov ered during t he ve r ba l
awareness test IGreenwald, 19 92) . Howeve r , if t he partial
l ea rner s cnly acquired fragmentar y knowledge , t he y would
have been correct only ha lf of the time on transfer . This
was not the case ; whe n trained on one irrelev a nt d i men s i on ,
partial learners responded correct ly t o 65 \ o f t he transfer
trials a nd when t r a i ned on two irrelevant dimens ions ,
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responded correctly to 92\ of transfer trials . Thus, this
explanation can be discounted with the peercrmence of the
partial learners on transfer when trained on two irrelevant
dimensions . The partial group in this condition performed
at the level of explicit learners, who understood both
dimensions of the covariation rule. clearly, the partial
learners could not have performed as well as the explcit
l e a r ne r s if they were on ly using fragmentary knowledge of
that rule.
summary and Conclusions
In their implicit learning studies, Broadbent and
colleagues (economic/production simulations; ~9 7 8 , 2984,
1986), Lewicki and colleagues (probability learning,· 298 7 ,
1988 ), and Reber and colleagues (artificial grammars; 2967 ,
1976) neither systematically varied task diffiCUlty nor used
a transfer task. These studies were designed to determine
whether implicit learning, in the verbally unreportable
sense, could occur in the paradigm employed . They were not
intended to be used as a means ?f drawing conclusions about
the efficiency of the implicit system as a function of t a s k
difficulty, nor as a way of investigating participants t
ability to transfer implicitly acquired information to a
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nove l task. There appears t o be on ly one study involving
ad ults i n which t r a ns fe r has been us ed to assess the
relative sophistication o f the implicit learning system
(Stadler, 1989 ) . He replicated the pattern learn ing
findings of Lewicki et al. (19 87 ) . However , i n s tead of
u s i ng a ve rbal awareness t es t, ~tadler s tudied the transfer
of pattern l e a r n i ng to a prediction task . In the t r ans f e r
t a sk , t he pa rtic i pants saw s ets of s t imuli similar t o those
used in training . As was t h e case in the pa ttern learn i ng
paradigm emp l oyed by Lewicki et al (1987 ) , the tar ge t
loca tion on t he fina l trial co uld be determined by t h e
sequen ce of four of t he previous simple t ria l s. In the
prediction task, however, the participants were exposed to a
question mark placed in each of t he f our quadrants on the
final t r i a l and were required t o guess the quadrant i n which
the target would appear . Trans fer t o the prediction task
was poor a s pa rticipants successfully indicated the target
l oca t i on 11 to 13 times out of 48 . Not only was t here no
evidence f or the part ic ipants' conscious kucw j ed qe of t he
rule, but it also demonstrated t hat wi th a mi nor task cha nge
the pa r t ici pa n t s cou ld n ot t r ansfer the information acquired
during training .
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The resul ts of eue present study, and t ho se o f Stadler
(1989) and Rab inowitz an d Howe (1 994) a llow f or some
interes t i ng specul ation about the i mp l i ci t l e a r ning system
and t he r ela tive " s mar t ne s s " of the unconscious . It would
appear that the i mplic i t system is more e fficient than the
explicit system i n dea ling wi t h some t Y'itE:S of complex
information . Certainly c h i s is t he conjecture of Lewi ck i et;
ar . (1992 ) an d Seger (1994) who propose that the implici t
l earn i ng system is more sophis t i cated i n structure and able
t o deal wi th mor e complex dependencies than t he explicit
system. Howeve r , the findings reported here and by Stadler
(1989 ) and Rab i nowit z an d Howe (1994) would appear to
s uggest that the uncons c ious Lu not p a r t i c u l a rly smart in
adapting acquired i nformation t o novel s itua t ions. It would
seem that maintenance of the co ntext u sed in training is
r eq ui red i n o rder f or the implicit system to pe r form
adequately . This is perhaps du e to a reliance on
associat ive l e ar n i ng .
I n general , i t may be the case tha t learning is not
exc lusivel y imp lici t or explici t . with the l evel o f task
diff iculty de t ermining which process domi nates in the
acquis i tion of inf orma tion . The results pre sent ed here
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sug ges t that for mos t inMviduals lear ni ng is primarily
explic i t on easy tasks and i mplicit on d i fficult tasks.
Thus, it would be expected t hat with a task o f suff icient
difficulty all participants would learn imp licitly . This is
probably what ha s been demonstrated i n the
economic/production simulation models of Br oadbent and
col leagues (l978; 1984 ; 1986 ) , the pattern learning studies
of Lewicki et al . (19 8 7; 19 88 ) I t he artif icial gramma r
studies of Rebe r (196 7 ; 1977) , and the p robabi l i ty l e a r n i ng
pa radigm of Rebe r an d Millward (1968) whe re the level of
task difficulty left part ic i pan ts unable to verbalize the
information acqui red despite t he evidence f or having l ea r ne d
the requi r ed r e lations . Clearly , i n these studies , i mpl i c i t
processes , an d perhap s assoc iat ive l ea rni ng, a llowed the
participants t o acquire t he nece s sar y dependencies and
relations among stimulus items r equ i r ed for successful
pe rforman ce.
Final ly , partial l ea ruers , a g ro up t hat h a s not ye t
been thorough ly i nvest igated , were identified i n the present
study . The co mplexi ty of t he find ings obtained with t he s e
participants suggests i nve st i ga t o r s should look Closely at
i ndividual di ff e r enc e s in learning on a co ntinuum r ang ing
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from implicit to partial to explicit. I n particular, verbal
awareness should be measured on a mUlti-point scale in or d er
to ob tain a more comp.Let e assessment of the processes
involved in learning .
7'
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Ta b le 1
N...",be r o f h .rt i cipant . Pe r C.U • •• Func t ion o f
I r relevant Tr a i n l ng Di_naion., an d Awar . n• • • Score
2
2
6
14
84
1
11
4
8
Table 2
M"an Nu mb ,, >; of E>;ror" to C>;it ,,>;ion (Standard Error of t h.. M.... "l
as a sunee r e n of r e r e r evene Di mensions and Awa r e n" a .. Scer.;>
Number of Irrelevant
Dimendens on Tr aining
1
1 0 .87 (1.96 )
2 2 .23 (3. 6 4)
16 . 5 5 (2 . 41 )
,
13. 17 1). 24 )
13 . 63 ( 2 . 3 5)
13 . 39 (2. 06)
85
,
6. 51(.97) 10 .18 (1. 24 )
28.37{3. 901 21. 41( 2 .23)
17 .4 3 (2. 55)
Table 3
Numbe r of Correct Rellponaell on Trane f er (St an dar d Er ro r of t h.. Me an l
ae a Func tion of Awareneae Sco r e and Number o f I r releva nt Tr .. 1nlng Ol menDi oll o
Number of J rr ,~ l '! vant
Di men s ion.. on Tra in i ng
,
4.5 1 ( . 7 9)
4 . 74 (, 3 5)
4 .63 (. 62 )
,
5. 22 ( .59)
7 .33 ( .3 0 )
6 .28 (. 42 )
8.
a
6 .8 7 ( .32 }
6 .90 1.41)
6 .88 ( . 25)
5.53 (. 35)
6 .3 2 (. 2 8)
Table 4
Numb" r o f Co rrltc t R"'lIpOnS '!IB TrAns f er (Standa r d Error of the Mean )
.18 a Fu nction of Grade a nd Te8t
I
6. 45( .53 )
6 .05 ( .50 )
M"" m co r-r-ect 6 .23 ( . 3 6 )
,
5.73 ( .53)
6.21( . sn
5 .97 ( . 47)
8 7
3
5 . 50( . 4 3)
5 . 63 (.58)
5 . 4B ( .35j
5 .74 ( 29 )
6.04 (.34)
\(a ) Tra i ning : 1 Irr elevant Dimension
(b) Training: 2 Irrelevant Dimensions
Figure 1
Example Stimulus Sets Used in Training
"
I
L
I
l~ J
Tran sfer : 3 Irrelevant Dimensions
Figure 2
Example Stimulus Set Used in Transfer
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i
I
I
Usually Implic i t Learners
( a )
~1\
I
Average Learners
(h i
Usually Explicit Learners
(e)
explicit gradient _
i mplicit gradient _
Figure 3
Task Difficulty Intercept for Usually Implicit . Average.
and Usual ly Explicit Le ar ne r s
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p rO~Ottion
I'. rtic: ipant .
Figure 4
Proportion of participants Who Learn at the Same Rate
Intrinsically and Extrinsically as a Function of
Task Difficulty
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pref e r e nce
f or Acce .. ..ing
Explic i t
In fo naatJon
T.alt Difficulty Intercept
Figure 5
Liklihood That Partial Learners Will Access Explicit
Information on Transfer a s a Function of t he Val ue of
Ta sk Difficulty at the Intercept Point
Appendix A
Verbal Awar e ness Test
"HOW DID YOU SOLVE THE PROBLEM? "
(A I CORRECT ANSWER ( IDENT I F ICATION OF CoyAB IAT I QN I
SCORE=)
· "DI D YOU LEARN THIS DURI NG TRAINING ?" YES / NO (if YES , stop)
*"DIO YOU FIR ST RECOGNIZE THIS WHEN I ASKED YOU?" YES / NO
(B) .II2ENl'J F I CATION OF ONt Y QNE DIMENSION OF CoyARUTTON
ASK, "HOW DI D YOU KNOW THIS; THERE WERE 2 (DIMENSI ON)
ONES? " IF SECOND DIMBNSION IS IDENTI F IED THEN,
SCORE=2
I F SECOND DIMENSION I S NOT IDENTIF I ED THEN,
SCQRE.. 1
( C ) IN CQBBRer ANSWER
ASK, "DI D YOU NOTICE ANYTHING ELSE? " IF NO,
SCORE=O
IF YES ANi) ONE DI MENSI ON ASK, " HOW DI D YOU KNOW THIS, THERE
WERE 2 (DI MENS I ON) ONE,c? " CORRECT ID ENTI FICATION OF SECOND
DI MENS I ON;
SCORE..2
INCORRECT IDENTI FICATION OF OR FAILURE TO I DENTIFY SECOND
DI MENSIO N;
SCORE=l
(D) NQ.....ANS!tE.R
ASK, "DI D YOU NOTI CE ANY PART ICULAR TYPE OF OBJEC TS WAS
CORRECT?" CORRECT IDENTIFICATION OF COVARIATIO N;
SCORE..)
IDENTIFICAT I ON OF ONLY ONE DIMENSION ASK, "HOW DID YOU KNOW
THI S; THERE WERE 2 (DIMENSI ON) ONES? " CORRECT ID ENTIFICATI ON
OF SECOND DI MENS ION;
SCORE=2
IN CORRECT ID ENTIFICATION OF FAILU RE TO IDENTIFY SECOND
DIMENSION ;
SCORE=l
INABILITY TO PROVIDE ANY ANSWER AT ALL;
SCORE=O
93




